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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960's and very early 1970 T s, formal relations
between the United States and the People's Republic of
China were in a state of suspension. Then, in July 1971,
President Richard Nixon stated publicly that he planned to
visit Peking the following year. This announcement, which
signalled a turning point in Sino-American relations and a
move toward normalization, took American allies in Asia by
surprise, especially Japan. Through Japanese eyes, any
policy change between her strongest ally and a communist
neighbor was extremely significant.
Since Japan is the leading industrial nation in Asia,
and since Japanese and U.S. interests are harmonious, it is
vital that we understand Japanese perspectives on U.S. for-
eign policy just as we expect Japan to understand our per-
spectives on her policies. The lack of complete understanding
by the U.S. was typified by the "Nixon shocks." Treatment
of Japan as an equal partner is a basic requirement for
maintaining the cooperative relationship which is essential
for achieving the purposes of both nations.
It must be recognized that when we use the word "Japan",
we refer to the official statements of policy which come
from government officials. However, this is not a complete
or adequate indication of the feelings or view of the
articulate members of the total Japanese society. There
*C.r>
are groups within and outside government which exert signifi-
cant influence on the process of decision-making.
The objective of this thesis is to examine Japanese
perspectives of U.S.-P.R.C. relations since 1971 through
the eyes of interest groups which have a significant foreign
policy role in Japan. It is vital that Americans understand
these perspectives in light of the potential for improved
Sino-American relations in the near term.
The paper will begin by highlighting some aspects of
Japan's foreign policy: her national interests, the four-
power equilibrium in East Asia (U.S., Soviet Union, P.R.C.,
and Japan), Japanese security problems vis-a-vis other
Pacific countries and defense problems and capabilities.
The second chapter will continue the discussion of foreign
policy by analyzing the roles of the major actors, includ-
ing the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), the opposi-
tion parties, the central bureaucracy, economic community
and public opinion.
To provide a basis for later sections of the paper,
Chapter Four looks at the development of U.S.-P.R.C. re-
lations from 19^9 to the present, covering the periods
of the Korean War, the Cold War, Vietnam and the Nixon
Doctrine
.
The fifth chapter traces the evolution of interest
group policies towards the U.S. and China from 19^9 to
1970. Against this background, the next chapter examines
the attitudes of these groups with respect to some major
feUft r>
issues in current Sino-American affairs (normalization of
relations, trade and resources, ideological conflict and
strategic balance).
The final chapter tabulates anticipated reactions of
Japanese interest groups to future U.S.-P.R.C. policy
developments
.
Japanese news organizations give extensive coverage to
political events in Japan in the English language, and both
U.S. and Japanese official agencies make available public
documents for English language readers. This wealth of
information enables the student adequately to cover all
facets of political viewpoints needed for this research in
spite of the limitation of not being able to consult the
Japanese materials in the language of origin.
no) n
II. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: SOME PERSPECTIVES
All nations have characteristics which shape their na-
tional interests. In Japan's case, these characteristics
are clear-cut. Japan is a small island country close to
the Asian mainland. She has few natural resources but is
highly industrialized. Although she is Westernized, the
roots of Japanese civilization run deep in Asia. In World
War II Japan was defeated by the United States and under the
American occupation severe military restrictions were im-
posed under Article Nine of her Constitution. It reads in
part
:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever re-
nounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling interna-
tional disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
2
The first characteristic is primary and largely shapes
Japanese interests. Ideally, Japan should control the
surrounding seas in order to ensure her security. Since
World War II, however, she has relied on the U.S. for carry-
ing out that task.
Sea control also relates to Japan's high degree of in-
dustrialization and lack of resources in that the security
For footnotes please see page
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of her shipping lanes is vital to the economy. Japan must
export in great quantities to pay for her needed fuel and
raw materials. A hostile power able to cut off this influx
of indispensable resources by sea could paralyze Japan.
Because of U.S. naval predominance in the Pacific, Japan's
only sensible security policy has been a close relationship
3
with the United States.
Therefore, the Japanese government in 1975, in fulfill-
ing this primary responsibility for protecting the sea lanes
established two shipping zones—designated as southwest and
southeast—extending not quite 1,000 nautical miles from
Japan. Future defense, the government argued, should hinge
on a strengthened anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability
within the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Furthermore, the
strength of the ASW force should be decided by Japan alone
and not be based upon a "division of labor" with the U.S.
Navy .
In addition to maintaining sea lines of communication,
it is also essential to Japan that she operate in a trading
system which allows Japan as much free trade as possible.
In the words of one Japanese official, "...prior to World
War II there were boycotts against and several limitations
on imports of Japanese goods and limitations on the export
to Japan of such things as wool, scrap iron and oil. In
response ... the Japanese tried to create a Greater Asia
Co-prosperity Sphere for the country's survival. But it
failed miserably. Ironically, Japan got in defeat what she
10
Ml r<
wanted."^ This vital Japanese interest in a free-trading
system has become more important as Japan's trade becomes more
global in nature and is the basis for her call for the separa-
tion of politics and economics.
There is considerable debate as to the importance of the
Korean Peninsula to Japanese security. Traditionally,
Japanese refer to Korea, whose tip is only 120 miles from
Kyushu, as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. But
modern science has altered this historic relationship.
Such distinguished observers as Edwin Reischauer, have im-
plied that South Korea is no longer vital to the defense of
Japan. He declared that South Korea is not vital to the
U.S. and that Japan is vital to the U.S. It therefore seems
to follow that South Korea is not fundamental to the defense
of Japan.
The Korean Peninsula has figured prominently in Japanese
military history. The Mongols twice attempted invasions of
Japan from Korea in the 13th Century, and both the Sino-
Japanese War of 189^-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of
1904-1905 were fought largely over the mastery of Korea.
At the present time, 600,000 Koreans live in Japan, and their
loyalty is divided between the two Korean governments. If
a conflict should ensue on the peninsula, the Japanese could
well have their hands full containing these minorities.
Adding to the Japanese national interest in Korea are
the substantial economic ties between the two countries.
In sum, while Korea may not be a vital interest for the
survival of Japan, the presence of a friendly government
11
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on the Korean Peninsula is important to Japanese security.
Many Japanese , emotionally as well as rationally, regard it
as such. Since the U.S. has a mutual defense treaty with
Korea, Japan has not had to bear responsibility for possible
military measures to safeguard her interests there.
Keeping these security interests in mind, let us now
look at the relative equilibrium of the four major powers
in East Asia and the Pacific with special attention to
Japan's current attitudes toward the U.S. and the P.R.C.
The four major powers in East Asia today are the U.S.,
the Soviet Union, the P.R.C. and Japan. This quadrilateral
of states seems relatively stable in that neither war be-
tween the great powers nor a significant shift in alignment
seems likely in the short term, although areas of conflict
exist in Korea, Taiwan, the Sino-Soviet border and South-
east Asia. Tensions in Korea have not magnified to the
point of the renewal of hostilities, and the Taiwan Straits
have calmed somewhat over the past twenty years. Prospects
between the two great communist powers are difficult to
judge, but neither would appear to have much to gain from a
military confrontation. In Southeast Asia some turmoil will
continue over the next decade but scarcely to the extent of
warranting the use of force in the region by any of the four
powers. Each will maneuver to improve its position by its
policies toward other members of the Big Four and by compe-
tition in Southeast Asia, but none appears likely to possess
12

in the near future both the power and the will to upset by
force the underlying stability of the four-power system.
It makes little sense for Tokyo to alter its alignment
within the present East Asian power quadrilateral. While
Japan will try to improve its relations with China and the
Soviet Union, it is extremely doubtful that it will shift
its basic economic and security ties to either of them.
Japan is dependent upon the noncommunist world for markets,
technology and raw materials, none of which can be provided
in large quantities by the P.R.C. or Russia in the near
future. Furthermore, despite their cultural ties to China,
most Japanese feel comparable affinity for Americans and
Western Europeans, whose societies are, like Japan's, open
and democratic. It should also be noted that Japan's eco-
nomic success can be largely attributed to the benefits of
the security provided by the U.S.
A feeling of insecurity, perhaps spawned by a withdrawal
of U.S. defense commitments in Asia, would compel Japan ei-
ther to look elsewhere for a military ally or assume full
responsibility for its own defense. Both developments would
tend to de-stabilize East Asia. A security arrangement be-
tween Japan and either communist power would heighten the
other's anxiety and lead to an arms escalation. On the
other hand, a heavily-armed Japan would revive old fears of





Thus the stability of the East Asian power system de-
pends to a significant degree upon the U.S. maintaining a
satisfactory security relationship with Japan. This require'
ment is presently being met by the U.S. -Japan Mutual Secur-
ity Treaty.
The American-Japanese alliance has served as the foun-
dation of Japan's national policies for the past 25 years.
It has made possible Japan's rise from defeat to affluence;
it secured for the U.S. close diplomatic cooperation with
the leading industrial state in Asia; and it provided a
basis for the massive and flourishing trade between the
7two nations. There have been strains in the relationship,
since some citizens in both countries oppose certain as-
pects of the alliance, but in general it has worked ex-
tremely well.
To understand the U.S. -Japan alliance from Japanese
eyes, one must look at several factors. First, security.
Japan has a combination of physical and psychological vul-
nerabilities. The country lacks strategic depth, having a
land mass of approximately 1^3,000 square miles and a
16,500 mile coastline. No point in Japan is more than 75
miles from the coast. Also, about half its population is
concentrated around the metropolitan areas of Tokyo and
Osaka-Kobe. The entire archipelago is within range of
Soviet medium-range bombers and ballistic missiles. More
importantly, however, are the psychological restraints on
maintaining a strong defense capability. At the conclu-
sion of World War II there was a bitter disenchantment with
14
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the military. It was as if the Japanese people had said,
"We tried the military way and it did not work." Although
somewhat tempered, this attitude still persists. Moreover,
Japanese leaders are painfully aware that postwar anti-
Japanese feelings are still very much alive in Asia and
could easily be exacerbated by a major military build-up.
The second factor to be considered is the strong eco-
nomic relationship between the U.S. and Japan. As with the
security arrangements, there is more Japanese dependence
upon the U.S. than vice versa. While the U.S. took 2H% of
Japan's exports in 1976, Japanese imports from the U.S.
amounted to only 8% of American exports . Not only is Japan
heavily dependent upon the U.S. market, but if transactions
with American-owned firms elsewhere in the world, U.S. in-
vestments in Japan, the flow of advanced technology from
the U.S. to Japan and invisible receipts from tourism and
other sources are included, at least 50% of Japan's foreign
economic relations depend directly or indirectly on the
U.S. 8
The third factor in understanding Japanese perspectives
on the U.S. -Japan alliance is the domestic political situa-
tion. As the only political party to hold power in Japan
over the past thirty years, the conservative Liberal-Demo-
cratic Party (LDP) has been a buttress for the close asso-
ciation with the U.S. Although its majorities in both
houses of the Diet are paper-thin, the opposition parties
are so divided that a unified opposition seems unlikely in
15

the near term. In the event that one of the opposition
parties or a coalition were to come to power, it is not clear
whether or not Japan would abrogate the security treaty.
A delicate change has recently been perceived in the party
platforms of the minority parties, excepting the Japan
Communist Party (JCP), on the handling of the treat. They
now suggest its abolition after negotiations with the U.S.
instead of prompt and unilateral abrogation. Given the
liklihood that the LDP will continue in power in the fore-
seeable future, a recent newspaper poll of the LDP Foreign
Policy Commission, an important party organization respon-
sible for drafting policy, is enlightening. The 6l members
of the commission were asked whether they believed that Japan
should continue to depend on the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security
Treaty. Amont the 46 members who replied in writing, all
Q
but three responded positively. A public opinion survey
by another newspaper revealed similar attitudes among pri-
vate citizens. In response to the question, "In the post-
Vietnam era do you think Japan should continue to support
the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treat?" 6l% of the respon-
dents replied yes, 11% replied no and 27% had no opinion.
One may conclude that, under present conditions, there is
widespread support for continuation of the alliance.
There are numerous forces at work which will test the
alliance in the future. The economic confrontation between
the U.S. and Japan began in earnest during the recession
year of 1970. Faced with a reduced domestic demand, Japan
16

increased her exports. The increased flow of Japanese goods
into the U.S. was not answered by a rise in American exports
to Japan, thus producing a growing deficit in the U.S. bal-
ance of trade between the two countries . Although not cur-
rently in a recession, both economies are operating at less
than peak, and the U.S. deficit with Japan in 1977 was in
the neighbrohood of eight million dollars. The ability of
the U.S. and Japan to solve this trade imbalance on a bi-
lateral basis will play a major role in future relationships
Another factor which may alter the alliance is the chang-
ing world situation. Japan will have to discard her passive
foreign policy because her economic power dictates that she
should make a greater contribution to the functioning of the
world economy, more than has been made in merely following
U.S. leadership. In the era of detente, Japanese diplomacy
will require more flexibility and imagination than in the
Cold War days, particularly in achieving better relations
with her communist neighbors.
The last force acting to weaken the U. S . -Japanese alli-
ance involves Japanese uncertainty over U.S. intentions in
Asia. Although the Japanese approve of the relaxation of
tension in East Asia that the U.S. detente with China has
brought, they are uncertain what the new U.S. relationship
with China portends for their relations with the U.S. The
"Nixon shock" of 1971 had a profound effect upon the Japa-
nese leadership. Since then and up to the unilateral U.S.
announcement of its phased troop withdrawal from Korea, the
17

Japanese grew increasingly fearful that the U.S. was being
less than candid with them on China and other crucial issues
Some Japanese, noting the more relaxed view of the U.S.-
Japan security treaty taken by Peking in 1972-1973, suspect
that the U.S. and China have agreed to cooperate in supres-
sing Japanese militarism. Others surmise that the ultimate
aim of American policy is to move the U.S. to a diplomatic
position equidistant between Japan and China. Japanese un-
easiness and uncertainty will be intensified if U.S. rela-
tions with the P.R.C. expand, particularly if friction be-
tween the U.S. and Japan increases and rivalry between Ja-
pan and China in East Asia grows. 1
In sum, although the U.S. -Japan alliance currently has
strong support in both countries, there are some difficult
problems, the solution to which will require close bilateral
cooperation. Some American observers, pointing to the in-
equality of the relationship, feel that the Japanese have
no alternative other than to maintain close ties with the
U.S. Dissatisfaction with excessive dependence on the U.S.
is a strong motiviation for Japanese leaders to seek a more
independent role for Japan. Thus it would be unwise to as-
sume that the manifest advantages to Japan of a continuing
close association with the U.S. and the difficulty of find-
ing a desireable alternative will necessarily guide the
Japanese. Indeed, one Japanese intellectual, Masataka
Kosaka, argues "...improvement of relations with the Soviet
Union precisely because her policy is so different from
18

that of the U.S., would widen the options for Japan. Thus,
it is only when Japan achieves better relations with the
Soviet Union than the U.S. with China that her voice will
be heard. n1 ^
To a degree exceeded only by relations with the U.S.,
China has been central to the foreign policy debate in Ja-
pan. Few Japanese see the P.R.C. as a military threat.
Yet extraordinary emotional and symbolic importance sur-
rounds the China issue for all politically articulate
groups. China stands as a revolutionary, nuclear-armed
Asian power, at times directly competing with Japanese in-
terests, as the critical key to war or peace in the region,
as the world's largest untapped market and as a nation with
which cultural-historic connections are profound. That the
issue transcends party lines is evident from the composi-
tion of the groups which pressed for early normalization of
relations with Peking— a coalition of nostalgic, conserva-
tive Sinophiles from the prewar era, opportunistic business-
men in search of the legendary China market and left-wing
1 3Maoist revolutionaries. J
Despite the cultural affinity there is some abrasiveness
in the attitudes of the Japanese and Chinese toward one
another. The Chinese feeling of superiority—the attitude
of aristocrat— comes from centuries of cultural preeminence.
The Japanese attitude, that of a self-made man, proud of
having reached the top through his own efforts, is some-
what patronizing toward the old aristocrat fallen on hard
1*1times, yet not entirely confident.
19
Ml r.
There appear to be distinctly different motives behind
Japan and China's movement to warmer relations. The Japa-
nese are interested primarily in promoting a good-neighbor-
ly relationship and in particular in developing bilateral
trade and economic relations. China, it seems is conduc-
ting its relations with Japan mainly in light of the con-
flict with the Soviet Union. Since the normalization of
relations in 1972, the Chinese do not talk anymore about
the revival of Japanese militarism or about Japan's eco-
nomic agression in Southeast Asia, and they accept the pre-
1 S
sent U.S. -Japan security treaty. J
Japan and China are engaged in a territorial dispute,
primarily concerning resources. In 1970 China claimed
sovereignty over the tiny, uninhabited Senkaku Islands,
positioned between the Ryukuyu Islands and mainland China.
It is thought that oil may lie under the ocean in that vi-
cinity. China also is not pleased with the joint Japanese-
South Korean oil venture south of the Korean Peninsula.
China claims rights over that area since it sits on the
continental shelf. But these disputes are low-key and so
far have not significantly hindered Sino-Japanese relations
The growth of Japanese economic power, the changing U.S.
role in East Asia and the rapprochement between the U.S.
and China have caused Tokyo and Peking to begin rethinking
i ft
their relationship with each other. The result was an
agreement reached in September, 1972, in which Japan recog-
nized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate
20

government in China, diplomatic relations were established
between Tokyo and Peking and diplomatic relations were
severed between Tokyo and Taipei. Shortly thereafter, Ja-
pan and Taiwan made an unofficial agreement to permit most
affairs between them to continue. Nonofficial organiza-
tions were set up in Japan and Taiwan, staffed largely by
diplomats on leave of absence from the two countries, res-
ponsible for "promoting the development of the two nations'
economic, trade, technological, cultural and other mutual
relations" and for "protecting the lives, property and
17interests" of nationals. Japanese economic relations with
Taiwan are substantial. 1976 trade totalled $3-5 billion,
and Japanese loans and interests in Taiwan are about $400
million. It should be noted that Japanese interests on the
island are sheltered to a large degree by the U. S . -Republic
of China security treaty.
Taiwan, therefore, has been set aside as an issue be-
tween Tokyo and Peking. Should the Chinese leaders push
for a unification of Taiwan to the mainland, it could be-
come a serious problem.
The principle force that may move the Japanese and
Chinese to a close relationship is the complementary nature
of their economies. Japan needs China's raw materials and
China needs Japan's capital and modern technology. Japan
is China's most important trading partner, accounting for
25% of China's foreign trade in 1975- But the rapid ex-
pansion of Sino-Japanese trade would be feasible only if
there should be a radical change in Chinese economic policy,
21

including a willingness to accept long-term loans from Japan
to pay for Japanese capital goods and technical assistance.
China's present leaders do not seem disposed to such a poli-
cy, therefore Japanese government officials and businessmen
do not expect dramatic trade increases. As a matter of fact,
1976 trade decreased by over $700 million from the 1975
figures
.
Some observers predict growing rivalry between Japan
and China for leadership in East Asia. Japan's economic
influence is expanding rapidly. China cannot hope to com-
pete on that basis in the near future but may attempt to
make political inroads. In any event, it is hard to pre-
dict differences which may arise between the two countries
as their relations develop with the nations of East Asia.
The confrontation between China and the U.S.S.R. places
Japan in a favorable bargaining position, since both sides
are seeking closer relations with the Japanese. It allows
Japan to seek economic policies favorable to itself, par-
ticularly concerning raw materials. Moreover, both China
and Russia are content with the U. S . -Japanese security
treaty, as they each would rather have Japan allied with
the U.S. than the other. This triangular relationship
places Japan in an extremely delicate position. Before
expanding relations with China, she must weigh very care-
fully the Soviet reaction, not wishing to annoy her power-
ful neighbor. Thus Japan can enjoy the benefits of the
Sino-Soviet conflict if she plays her cards adroitly.
22

Summarizing, most experts see a cautious improvement of
relations between Japan and China in the near future. The
quadrilateral balance dictates that there be no major shift
towards China by Japan.
In addition to relations with the U.S. and the P.R.C.
Japan has been concerned with the Soviet Union, which can-
not be ignored in determining her own place in the four
power equilibrium. While Japan does not want to cut her-
self off completely from the U.S. in trying to solve such
issues as the development of Siberia, she wishes to keep
as many options open as possible so that she will not be-
come merely a puppet of the U.S. in whatever may develop
in Soviet-American relations.
The development of Soviet-Japanese relations since
World War II has been slow. Having failed in the 1950 T s
to neutralize Japan, the Soviet Union began to reach an
accommodation in the 1960's. Seen in the light of the Sino-
Soviet conflict, the timing of the new approach coincided
with the period when Moscow and Peking's differences came
out in the open. The latest developments in Sino-Japanese
and Sino-American relations may move the Russians, increas-
ingly isolated in Asia, to attempt a much closer relation-
ship with Japan.
Any improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations since
normalization in 1956 must be couched in economic terms.
Trade between the two countries has risen from virtually
nothing to over $3 billion annually. In fact, Japan is
23

the U.S.S.R.'s chief Asian trading partner. The potential
for growth is substantial. Japan needs Soviet raw materials
and the Soviet Union requires technology and capital—among
other things to finance the Siberian resource procurement
program. Negotiations between the two countries on the
Siberian oil and natural gas projects are currently stale-
mated for a variety of reasons, including reluctance on
Japan's part to establish dependence on Soviet raw materials
and unwillingness of Japanese bankers to sink billions of
dollars into the project without U.S. backing. Japanese
also take into account the vehement Chinese opposition to
the proj ect
.
Despite these economic advances, Soviet-Japanese rela-
tions are still basically coldly formal for the following
reasons. First, the Japanese people have a long-standing
feeling of hostility for their northern neighbors. Russia
has historically been seen as a menacing threat, and today
most Japanese view the Soviet union as their primary poten-
tial military opponent. The memory of the last minute
violation of the 19^1 Neutrality Pact and entry of the
Soviet Union into the Pacific war reinforced Japanese dis-
trust and suspicion of Russians.
Secondly, the main obstacle to the signing of a formal
treaty ending World War II hostilities between the Soviet
Union and Japan is the northern territories problem. Ja-
pan claims the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which the
Soviet government has agreed to relinquish upon the signing
of a peace treaty, and also Kunashiri and Etorofu, the
24

southern islands in the Kurile chain. The Japanese legal
case is not strong. Under the terms of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, which the Soviet Union did not sign, Japan
renounced all claims to the Kurile Islands. In 1955, how-
ever, during negotations with the Soviet Union over normal-
ization of relations, the Japanese government requested
Kunashiri and Etorofu be returned. The Soviets refused,
but diplomatic relations were established, nonetheless.
In themselves, the four islands are not important in either
a military or economic sense, but the territorial problem
has an important symbolic value for both powers. The
Soviet Union does not want to establish a precedent for
other territorial claims against her, while Japan wants
proof of Soviet sincerity in the form of peaceful settle-
ment of the matter in her favor. Both sides are adamant
and treaty negotiations have been suspended.
Yet another reason for the slow development of relations
has been the fishing problem. Japanese fishermen have been
frequently seized and harassed for allegedly intruding into
Soviet waters. Recently, however, Japan and the Soviet
Union signed an interim pact which allows Japanese fisher-
men access to the waters in question but sharply limits
their quotas. Bargaining over long-term agreements are
continuing
.
Finally, Soviet attacks on Japanese re-militarization
have served to dampen relations. The Sovients are probably
genuinely concerned that Japan's growing economic clout,
25

coupled with the decreased U.S. military presence in East
Asia called for by the Nixon Doctrine, may lead to increased
19
military commitments by Japan. Still, Soviet leaders are
publicly much more alarmed by the "Chinese threat."
In the near future, gradual economically-motivated im-
provement in Soviet-Japanese relations can be expected, but
distrust will probably prevent a radical move closer to-
gether. Moreover, Japanese unwillingness to antagonize
China will deter her from moving hastily. It appears un-
likely that Japan will make a substantial shift in align-
ment toward the U.S.S.R. unless the four-power balance
alters significantly.
Korea is the East Asian focal point of the interests of
the four powers. In Japan's eyes, stability on the penin-
sula is essential to her own security for the reasons stated
earlier. Here again, American military commitment has pro-
tected Japanese interests. If, however, the credibility of
the U.S. pledge to defend Korea declines, Japan may be
moved to re-evaluate its defense policy, which in turn
would profoundly effect the East Asian power system.
The present policy of the Japanese government towards
the Korean Peninsula is to strengthen cooperative relations
with the Republic of Korea and, at the same time, gradually
to increase contact and exchanges with the Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea in the fields of humanity, culture,
sports and trade, so as to generate a correct mutual under-
go
standing; but not to recognize North Korea. A number of
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factors make this a difficult policy to carry out. Koreans
retain bitter memories of the 36-year rule under Japan, the
Japanese mass media are critical of South Korea's domestic
human rights policy, and the large Korean minority in Japan,
which is split between the two Koreas and is vocal in ex-
pressing support for the governments, obliges the Japanese
government to face up to difficult political and diplomatic
decisions
.
Despite these hindrances, Japanese trading-company di-
plomacy has paid off. Japanese trade in 1976 totalled
$4.7 billion with South Korea and $168 with North Korea.
The 1977 pace is well ahead of the previous year's. Japa-
nese businessmen also have significant investments in the
South Korean economy.
The Japanese government, then, will do all it can to
prevent conflict in Korea. In addition to the security
aspect, domestic ramifications within Japan could result
if the Korean situation flares up. Not only would a bitter
political struggle ensue, with the LDP supporting South
Korea and many among the opposition favorable to North
Korea, but many Japanese might object to the use of U.S.
bases in Japan for Korean operations. Whatever scenario
develops, Korea, more than any single issue, has the poten-
tial to provoke a major change in the direction of Japanese
21defense policy.
Relations with the nations of Southeast Asia have been
of less than first-rank importance and the area is not
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considered vital to the Japanese economy. 2 Still, economic
ties with the region are significant. In 1975, Japan ex-
ported $6 billion worth of goods to Southeast Asia, 10.8$
of her total. In return, Japan took $5-5 billion of the
area's exports, or 2h% . The Association of Southeast Asia
Nations (ASEAN), which includes Indonesia, Thailand, Malay-
sia, Singapore and the Philippines, is now Jpan's second
p olargest trading partner after the U.S. J
Japan's problem in her relations with Southeast Asia is
to avoid an excessive economic presence, opening herself to
criticism of economic imperialism. For this reason and to
solve the lingering memories of World War II, Japan is pro-
viding economic assistance to ASEAN. In August 1977 Prime
Minister Pukuda promised $1.5 billion in grants and credits
to the ASEAN members. He received scant domestic praise,
since many Japanese question the judgment of the government
in promising the money when the economy is not completely
healthy
.
Following the statement of economic assistance, the
Prime Minister delivered the so-called Fukuda Doctrine,
which has been described as the most comprehensive state-
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ment of Japan's position towards Asia since World War II.
In his statement, Fukuda again rejected the role of a mili-
tary power for Japan, said that "our ( Japan-ASEAN) material
and economic relations should be animated by heartfelt com-
mitments to assisting and complementing each other as fellow
Aseans," called for equal partnership between Japan and the
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Association and, finally, insisted on fostering a "rela-
tionship based on mutual understanding" with the Indochinese
countries . J
Based primarily on economic motivation, Japan has a
significant stake in Southeast Asian stability. Japanese
sea lines of communication are particularly vulnerable in
the area and a conflict could threaten them. Moreover,
Japanese economic interests could only be hurt by increased
tension.
Some observers feel that a confrontation between Japan's
economic power and Chinese ambitions for political influence
will occur in Southeast Asia. They reason that China will
attempt to expand her sphere of influence over the region in
the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. Whether or not Peking will
risk alienating Tokyo considering the dynamics of the Japan-
China-U. S . S .R. triangle is difficult to predict.
In any event, taking into account her economic ties to
Southeast Asia, Japan cannot take lightly her relations with
the countries in that area.
Following the analysis of Japan's national interests in
East Asia, it is appropriate to examine briefly her total
defense policy. In essence, "Japan will depend on the cred-
ibility of the American nuclear deterrent .. .With this basic
characteristic Japan's defense capability should be ready
to deal with a contingency by denying others easy armed
agression. This defense capability, together with the U.S.-
Japan security system, must form a defense posture that
leaves no operational deficiency." 2 "
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The 1976 defense outlay totalled less than 1% of the
Gross Narional Product. During the past ten years Japan's
defense budget has amounted to between 0.8 and 0.9 percent
of her GNP. This percentage is small when compared to the
U.S. and Soviet figures but considering the growth of the
Japanese economy, it represents an increasing expenditure
and an improvement in capability. As of March, 1976, man-
power levels in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were as
follows: ground forces 155,000, maritime personnel 40,000
and air forces 43,000. The country has 15-5 divisions,
168,000 tons of naval shipping and 610 combat aircraft.
The defeat suffered in World War II and the experience
of nuclear bombing have created a very strong anti-military
feeling in Japan. The Constitution renounces war and the
government has adopted the "three principles" of nuclear
policy: Japan will not manufacture, possess or permit the
entry of nuclear weapons. The gradual strengthening of the
country's self-defense forces indicates a decline in the
people's military inhibitions. The Japanese have, accord-
ing to public opinion polls, accepted the fact that the
self-defense forces are permitted under the constitution.
However, there is no conscription in Japan and the Self-
Defense Force has difficulty in keeping its strength up to
allowance. Not only are there domestic constraints on a
significant military build-up. Many Japanese fear that the
country's economic relations with Asian states would be hurt
due to fear of revived Japanese militarism.
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The people remain firmly opposed to acquiring nuclear
weapons. In a 1973 poll, when asked "Do you think it is
necessary or not necessary for Japan to have its own nuclear
weapons for the defense of the security of its own country?",
20% of the respondents answered necessary and 66% not neces-
sary. ' Most Japanese defense writers feel that nuclear
weapons would not increase Japan's security but would make
her neighbors nervous, thus increasing tensions. Nonethe-
less, some observers feel that the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by Japan is inevitable.
In summary, most Japanese do not see any significant
military threat and strongly oppose a large defense estab-
lishment. They believe that an increase in strength would
divert funds from the economy, thus degrade the standard of
living. Nonetheless, a change in the international system
unfavorable to Japan could rekindle strong nationalist emo-
tions and erode popular opposition to a stronger defense
capability. If Japan perceives a great enough threat, per-
haps from a loss of the American nuclear deterrent credi-
bility or a unified, hostile Korea, here can be little
doubt that she will act to insure her own security, regard-
less of what the Constitution says.
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III. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: THE ACTORS
The goal of this paper is to gain a better understanding
of Japanese viewpoints regarding current U.S.-P.R.C. rela-
tions. There are many diverse groups in Japan which main-
tain opinions on this matter, but only those groups which
can significantly affect foreign relations will be addressed
here. This chapter will describe how each foreign policy
actor contributes to the overall process, while later chap-
ters will develop group perspectives on the Sino-American
relationship
.
A. LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)
Three groups comprise the "conservative leadership" of
Japan: the ruling LDP, big business ( zaikai ) and the cen-
tral bureaucracy. While the latter two exercise influence
over the politicians, it is the elected members of the Diet
who control Japanese foreign policy. As the highest organ
of state power, the Diet, consisting of the House of Coun-
cillors (Upper House) and the House of Representatives
(Lower House), through its majority party or coalition,
selects the Prime Minister, who in turn appoints his cabi-
net. Unlike the U.S. Chief Executive, the Japanese Prime
Minister's term of office may be terminated by the House of
Representatives (but not by the Councillors). The Lower
House prevails over the Upper House in other matters, in-
cluding over-riding a defeated bill, making it clearly the
more powerful of the two houses of the Diet.
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The presence of a "one-and-a-half" party system in Ja-
pan (the LDP being the one and the minority parties being
the half) has curtailed the Diet's parliamentary role. Since
its inception in 1955, the LDP has won every Lower House
election. The opposition parties have yet to singly or
jointly mount a threat to this reign of power. Because LDP
members adhere strictly to party line when voting in the
Diet, policy is in effect decided when agreed upon within
LDP circles . Understanding the inner workings of the LDP
and its policy-making process is paramount to understanding
Japanese foreign affairs.
The Liberal-Democratic Party was founded in 1955 when
the two leading conservative parties merged. The new party
continued to rely upon the traditionally conservative rural
agricultural areas and the business community for its sup-
port. With the rapid modernization of Japan's industry in
the decades of the 1950's and 1960's, more and more people
congregated around the metropolitan areas. Since It runs
counter to the party's interest, the LDP has been reluctant
to bring the Diet constituencies into line with the popula-
tion shift. Representation of the industrial centers has,
however, been grudgingly increased. Because of the gradual
erosion of its power base, the LDP's Diet majority has slid
from an overwhelming position to a paper-thin one. Despite
this decline in support, the opposition parties have yet to
threaten the LDP's leadership, thus the conservative party
remains by far the strongest in Japan.
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The LDP maintains a very close association with the
business community in Japan. Although the economic interest
groups will be examined more closely in a later section of
this chapter, the government-business relationship will be
briefly defined here
.
There exist a number of formal means through which the
government and the business world exchange policy views.
The large economic organizations prepare formal position
papers on issues which interest them and submit them to the
Prime Minister. The government has neither the time nor
the expertise to adquately research all issues and often
depends upon business to advise it of the best courses of
action. The economic community also has seats on half-
private, half-bureaucratic deliberation councils which have
been set up around the ministries to discuss new policies.
Another formal avenue is through party committees. Busi-
nessmen often appear before the committees and divisions of
the LDP's policy research council to try to influence party
policy
.
Also important are the informal channels of communica-
tion between business representatives and government/party
officials. The economic community has formed clubs around
each important party member and government minister. During
these club meetings ideas are exchanged and personal rela-
tionships are strengthened. LDP factional organizations
are another extra-official means of communication. Business
representatives will attend factional sessions called to
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discuss various problems facing the country. Politicians
and businessmen also form groups to promote a common inter-
est, such as the Japan-Republic of China Cooperation Com-
mittee .
Why does the ruling party pay such close attention to
the opinions of the economic community? As mentioned ear-
lier, the government often depends upon the expertise of
business to recommend sound economic policy. Perhaps more
important, however, is the fact that big business is the
LDP's principal source of political funds. One study found
that a particular Dietman's average monthly expenses totalled
about three million yen while his monthly net income (salary)
was only about 600,000 yen. Most of this discepancy is
made up by gifts from the Dietmember's koenkai (personal
support group) and funds provided by the factional leader,
who in turn receives substantial business contributions.
Without a factional boss to bankroll his expenses, a member
of the Diet would in most cases be hardpressed financially.
Political contributions are made to the LDP in three ways
Money is given to the party's central organization, to fac-
tions and to individuals. Because funds are made available
to individuals and faction leaders, it is conceivable that
certain interest groups could become closely affiliated with
specific Dietmen or groups of Dietmen. This does not appear
to be the case in the LDP, whose prime benefactor, the eco-
nomic community, sees its interests as too broad to limit
itself to favoring one faction or a few individuals.
35

The most powerful men within the LDP are the faction
leaders. Contrary to public statements disclaiming the
existence of factions within the party, the LDP is divided
into cohesive, semi-permanent groups whose members are not
difficult to identify. According to one observer, "The
factions, built around a single personality, are in a basic
sense autonomous parties, having their own independent sour-
ces of finance, running their own candidates under the LDP
label, and regularly caucusing for discussion of political
strategy and, occasionally, of policy matters.
"
2 9 it has
also been noted that "Factionalism reflects the ambitions
of the stronger political personalities for the posts of
party President-Prime Minister and for the other ministerial
or party positions that confer prestige, power and (usually)
political longevity on those selected. It also reflects the
policy differences and the varied special interest groups
that are found within the wide political range covered by
the parent party—though to a lesser extent, because a fac-
tion cannot afford to have too narrow a base of supporters
or be committed to a restricted range of issues if its
leader hopes to exert maximum influence or to reach the par-
ty presidency."^
No faction contains a majority of Diet members. There-
fore, a number of faction leaders form a coalition and
elect one of themselves as party President. This ruling
coalition is referred to as the "mainstream" of the LDP,
leaving the remainder of the factions as "non-mainstream."
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The coalition of factions constrains the Prime Minister in
his task of party leadership since he must obtain the agree-
ment of the other faction leaders prior to embarking on a
new policy.
The presence of factional politics detracts from res-
ponsible and effective democratic government in Japan,
according to some observers. Policy debate and decisions
are carried out behind closed doors away from the public
eye. These critics also feel that frequent Cabinet shuffles
that reflect factional power battles hinder the routine bus-
iness of the central government. On the other hand, others
believe that the pluralistic style of LDP politics prevents
an autocratic Prime Minister. Pseudo-attempts at party re-
form have been largely ineffective. Usually, the Prime
Minister, dealing from strength and with an eye on public
opinion, calls for party unity—naturally behind his leader-
ship. The other faction leaders resist, not willing to
sacrifice their power bases; the system continues.
Following the December 1976 elections the LDP House of
Representatives factional breakdown was as follows: Takeo
Fukuda 52, Kakuei Tanaka 42, Masayoshi Ohira 38, Yasuhiro
Nakasone 38, Takeo Miki 32, Etsusaburo Shiina 11, Mikio
Mizuta 12, Naka Funada 8, ex-Ishii 4.3 1 During the Decem-
ber 1976 Lower House elections there were 2^9 Liberal-Demo-
crats elected plus twelve "independents" who are likely to
side with the conservatives during voting. This combina-
tion gives the LDP a narrow majority in the 511-member
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House of Representatives. A similar arrangement between
the LDP and independents exists in the 252-member House of
Councillors
.
In the current LDP organization there are three formal
decision-making bodies. These are the party conference,
the assembly of the members of the Diet and the executive
council. According to party law the party conference is
"the supreme organ of the party." Included in its member-
ship are all Diet members of the party and four representa-
tives from each of the prefectural federations. The con-
ference is convened regularly once each year or on special
occasions. Despite its lofty raison d'etre, the party con-
ference is in practice only a rubber stamp. There is gen-
erally little debate, and the meeting may last only a few
hours. The conference exists to place the highest endorse-
ment on the most important party policy decisions.
The second formal decision-making body of the LDP is
the assembly of the members of both houses of the Diet.
Party law says that the assembly is "to examine and decide
especially important questions concerning party management
and activities in the Diet" and "to substitute for the par-
ty conference in matters requiring an urgent decision." As
with the party conference, the assembly does not usually
come to grips with important issues. The decisions will
already have been made in closed session, and the assembly
is called to ratify those decisions. Sometimes party leaders
will use the assembly to report actions taken or planned.
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Approval by the assembly will probably be the last step in
the policy-making process unless the ma-ter can wait until
the party conference convenes.
The executive council is the third formal decision-
making organ of the party. This group "discusses and de-
cides important matters of party management and Diet
activities" and consists of about thirty men. The chairman
of the executive council, along with the party President,
secretary-general and chairman of the policy research coun-
cil, is regarded as one of the top four men in the LDP.
The improtance of the executive council can be seen by the
fact that it must approve recommendations of the policy re-
search council before they become official LDP policy. En-
dorsement is not automatic. But, as one party official
stated, "Foreign affairs are always delicate. While there
are many opinions, nobody wants to take the responsibility
of overruling the Foreign Ministry. Its opinion will usual-
ly carry the day."
In the foreign policy area, it is the foreign affairs
section of the LDP's policy research council that appears
to play a controlling role in determining what the party
will formally sponsor in the Diet. 33 One LDP member stated
"On daily business, it is the bukai (foreign affairs section)
that is nearly always supreme. Afterwards, the only remain-
ing problem in the Diet is dealing with the opposition
parties
.
The executive council of the LDP controls the policy
research council by its power of appointment. The chairman
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of the policy research council is appointed by the party
President with the endorsement of the executive council.
The chairman then appoints the heads of the various divi-
sions, again with the approval of the executive council.
The meetings of the sections of the policy research
council are used for policy debates. Decision-making with-
in this framework tends to take the form of accomodation of
external interest groups, the balancing of factional inter-
ests and the dominance of the current mainstream factional
alliance headed by the party President. J Business groups,
government agencies, LDP factions and intra-party interest
groups (such as the Asia Study Group) appear to use the
meetings of the foreign affairs section to argue their
positions
.
It would be simplistic to state that the foreign policy
of Japan is completely determined in these closed meetings
of LDP organs. The foregoing indicates, however, that the
Diet does not take part in the initial steps of foreign
policy formulation. In fact, the degree of Diet participa-
tion is determined by the LDP. If it choses to disregard
public opinion and political opposition, as it did with the
ratification of the U.S. -Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security of I960, the LDP is presently in a position to
push through any legislation it choses.
B. THE PARTIES IN OPPOSITION
1955 marked the beginning of what was to be the two-
party system in Japan but in fact became the "one-and-a-half"
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party system. In that year the two conservative parties
joined to form the LDP, and the left and right wing social-
ist parties became the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). These
were to be the participants in the two-party system. The
JSP, however, could not develop a threat to the conservative
rule and the current multi-party system evolved. Currently,
there are five parties in opposition to the government of
Japan: the JSP, the Komeito (Clean Government Party), the
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Japan Communist Party
(JCP) and the New Liberal Club (NLC). This section of Chap-
ter Three will examine the role of the opposition parties
in the foreign policy-making process in Japan.
1. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
JSP membership today total about 50,000. The party
holds 123 of the 511 seats in the Lower House and has 56 of
the 252 members in the Upper House, more than any other op-
position party. Normally, over ten million people vote for
JSP candidates during an election. This support stems from
several factors. The socialists have capitalized upon the
peace-loving and neutralist feelings of Japanese people.
The party officially stands for unarmed neutrality, thus
strongly opposes rearmament and the U.S. -Japan Mutual Secu-
rity Treaty. More vital to the JSP's strength, however, is
its affiliatin with Sohyo, Japan's largest national federa-
tion of trade unions. In fact, the JSP has been called the
political arm of Sohyo, since it supplies two-thirds of the
party's members, contributes enormous funds for Socialist
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election campaigns and, more often than not, provides the
candidates for election to the Diet (62% of the total JSP
members of the Diet are also members of Sohyo and its con-
stituent unions and a Neutral Trade Union Federation.^ )
.
While the JSP's dependence upon Sohyo represents its
primary strength, this association also has stagnated the
party's growth. Those people outside the unions such as
unskilled workers and students cannot identify with the
party's union image. The JSP's leadership realizes that it
must increase its membership and appeal if it is to chal-
lenge the LDP. The manner of achieving this goal is a
source of bitter controversy within the party.
The left wing of the JSP, which is oriented along Marx-
ist-Leninist lines, advocates increasing the number of par-
ty members consistent with the principles of a working class
party. The view held by the right wing maintains that if
the party is to have any hope of coming to power it must
shed its communist leanings and become a people's, not work-
er's, party. Tomomi Narita, the party chairman, although
belonging to neither faction, seems to lean more to the
left wing point of view. This inclination is consistent
with the factional strengths within the party.
JSP formal organization is similar to the LDP's. The
highest decision-making body of the party is the central
executive committee. Beneath it are various special policy
committees. The JSP holds National Congresses at which, un-
like the LDP, lively personal and factional debates are held
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in the open. The congress produces the Party's Action Poli-
cy which does seem to influence party leaders in their de-
cision making. While the party congress may impress the
Japanese people with its democratic flavor, it also exposes
the JSP as divided and unsure of its future paths.
It should also be noted that the labor unions take
advantage of their relationship with the party by influenc-
ing JSP policy. Union leaders coordinate their demands and
present them to the party committees and executives. In
formulating JSP guidelines, it is not clear whether the
party or union leadership has the upper hand.
2 . Komeito (Clean Government Party)
One of the newest members of the opposition group
is the Komeito. Membership includes 120,000 Japanese. The
Komeito is the second ranking party in opposition, as it
has 55 members in the Lower House and 2h in the Upper House.
The Komeito was founded in 1964 under the sponsor-
ship of the Sokaggakai, or Value Creation Society , a sect of
Nichiren Buddhism. One of its goals was the creation of
"Buddhist democracy," and the party advocated a basic poli-
cy of "centralism beyond left-right conflict." The Komeito
leaders are all Sokaggakai members and about 90% of the
party's members belong to the religious sect.
Since the Sokaggakai strives for increased individu-
al happiness through faith and prosperity, most of its fol-
lowers are from the lower classes of society. This appeal
puts the Komeito in direct competition with the communist
party for votes. Another reason for mutual hostility is
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the clash between Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism. Due to its
religious affiliation the Komeito attracts conservative voters,
while its call for political reform also draws progressive
votes. These two forces combine to give the Komeito a tight-
knit, morally-conscious membership. However, as with the
JSP, the party's strength is also its weakness. The Sokag-
gakai is highly intolerant of other religions and this self-
righteous attitude incenses many people.
Sensing the political impracticality of an attitude
of intolerancy, the Sokuggakai and the Komeito announced in
1970 their policy of "separation of politics and religion."
The Sokuggakai was said to be just one of the Komeito' s sup-
porting organizations, and the party was opened up to non-
members of the religious sect. To the contrary, there is
little doubt that the Komeito is still the political arm of
the Sokuggakai.
Since the Komeito is dedicated to improving life for
the lesser-privileged in Japan, its basic platform has been
reformist. Jointly with the JSP, it has attached the LDP's
support for, and connections with, big business. The Komeito
is neutralist, and opposes the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security
Treaty and the close ties existing between Japan and the free
world.
The structure of the Komeito parallels that of the
Sokuggakai. The Sokuggakai organization has a central office
headed by a President, who is then linked to local groups.
The lowest cell is composed of five to ten households. The
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entire organization campaigns for the Komeito candidates at
election time. This religious-political task force repre-
sents a growing threat to the conservative rule in Japan
today.
3- Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)
The DSP, with 40,000 members, is a relatively small
party. Nonetheless with 29 representatives in the Lower
House and 10 men in the Upper House, it cannot be ignored
politically.
The DSP was born in January i960 with the right wing
of the JSP bolted to form the new party. The underlying
reasons for the split are yet today the basis for the ideal-
ogical differences between the two parties.
The primary and most illustrative of the factors be-
hind the split was the issue of ratification of the U.S.-
Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The left wing of the JSP was
for immediate abolition of the security arrangement. The
right wing forces took the approach that sought compromise
with the LDP, thus calling for conditional extension of the
treaty in exchange for concessions. While the leftist fac-
tion of the JSP still attacks all opposing views, the DSP
sees itself as a moderating force in Japanese politics
—
anti-LDP but also anti-communist. The democratic socialists
picture themselves as responsible opposition, not "absolute
opposition.
"
Although DSP representation in both houses of the
Diet has fallen from its original 55 in i960, the party still
mainatains the support of the All-Japan Labor Federation (Zen
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Nihon Rodo Sodomei, or Domei for short), the second-largest
Japanese labor organization. Domei is based on the private
industry unions and has a great deal of say over DSP poli-
cies. The democratic socialists also have the support of
some business circles, who see them as a counter-communism
force
.
DSP supporters are a wide-ranging group. According
to an Asahi Shimbun poll of October 1976, 17.6% of the DSP's
followers are industrial workers, 36% are clerical workers
and 19.1$ are self-employed businessmen. The party is also
supported by right-wing farmers . The DSP has not garnered
widespread progressive support because of its willingness to
compromise with the LDP, which weakens the opposition as a
whole
The diversity of backers is reflected in the DSP's
somewhat ambiguous position between government and opposi-
tion. Although the party has entered into temporary tacti-
cal coalitions with the Komeito and the JSP, in general it
is more critical of leftist elements than of conservatives.
DSP leaders have even indicated willingness to consider a
coalition with the LDP, if necessary, to keep that party in
power ahead of the JSP. This has led some critics of the
DSP to label it "the second LDP."
4. Japan Communist Party (JCP)
The JCP has a membership approaching 400,000. There
are 19 communists in the House of Representatives and 16 in
the House of Councillors. The 1976 Lower House elections
dealt a severe blow to the party as they lost 21 seats, over
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half their members. Communists are consoled somewhat by the
fact that their percentage of the popular vote did not de-
cline significantly (10.5% in 1972 and 10.4% in 1976).
The JCP has worked hard to gain respectability, and to-
day the party's top goal is to establish a reputation befit-
ting a responsible political group in a democratic society.
In order to meet this goal, the JCP has taken a num-
ber of actions. It has stated that it does not advocate vio-
lent revolution or one party rule in Japan. The party has
also taken an independent stance with respect to the world
communist movement, foregoing close ties with both the Soviet
Union and China. The communists counter charges of revision-
ism by saying that their policy is the correct evolution of
Marxism-Leninism in Japan's case.
The JCP's present platform calls for a two-stage
revolution. In the first stage, a popular front of national
unity will rise to fight capitalism and imperialism. Once
the old order is toppled, the second stage of building a
Socialist state will begin. The communists emphasize that
the revolution must be achieved through the will of the
majority of Japanese.
Support for the JCP stems from the rapid growth of
the economy and its side effects. People disenchanted by
pollution, overcrowded cities and depressed wages were attrac-
ted to the communist cause. There is obviously competition
between the JSP, the Komeito and the JCP for the attention
of the discontented masses. The communists have become very
active at the grassroots level by providing medical services,
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legal aid and support for protest movements. These activi-
ties were instrumental in strengthening the JCP at the local
level, where the communists have representation on 3,200 pre-
factural and municipal councils throughout Japan.
5- The New Liberal Club (NLC)
The newest opposition party is the NLC. This party
was set up in June 1976 when six Dietmen withdrew from the
LDP to form a new political group. These men reasoned that,
in the wake of the Lockheed scandal, the LDP was incapable
of reforming itself. The members of the NLC also were very
likely disenchanted with the gerontocracy ruling the LDP and
the seniority system prevailing in that party.
In its first election, the NLC scored a spectacular
victory by coraling 17 seats in the Lower House. In the
July 1977 Upper House elections the NLC elected four members,
an increase of three. Although it is not yet clear who the
NLC is hurting most, the LDP or the other opposition parties,
its conservative philosophy and former LDP support is un-
doubtedly drawing some votes away from the ruling party.
An Asahi Shimbun survey of October 1976 showed that 33-8% of
the NLC supporters were university graduates as compared
with 13.3/& for the LDP.
The NLC has not yet shown itself to be anything more
than a faction of the LDP. In fact, some members of the
JSP and JCP suspect that the LDP and NLC are collaborating
to keep progressive voters from supporting their parties.
NLC plicies vary from the LDP's in that its members advocate
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financial contributions only to individuals (and supposedly
practice this rule) and believe in two conservative parties
since "representative government is strengthened by the exis-
tence of a plurality of political parties wedded to the cause
of liberalism."
To date, the NLC has not made its position clear re-
garding coalition policies. The group's future is problema-
tic. It may re-merge with the LDP when the latter' s house
is in order or it may develop into a bona-fide opposition
party.
Because the policies of this fledgling political
party are unclear, the NLC will not be included in later




The Politics of Opposition
This subsection will address the coalition positions
of the opposition parties and discuss the methods available
to them for affecting Japanese foreign policy.
The JSP's official position is that a joint coalition
of all opposition parties is desireable. This impractical
stance was necessitated by the intransigence of the other
opposing parties. While the JCP's basic strategy is to co-
operate with the JSP, the Komeito and the DSP are amenable
to a coalition with the JSP but not the communists. Thus,
the socialists are being pulled from both the left and the
right. So far they have declined to make a choice, saying
that "during the fight against the LDP and monopoly capital
it will become clear which of the DSP and the JCP will drop

The Diet's formal role in foreign affairs is defined
by the Constitution. It is the sole law-making organ of the
state, must ratify treaties before they become effective,
and it may question the executive branch of government re-
garding the conduct of foreign policy. As noted earlier,
however, since the LDP can count on a majority vote anytime,
international affairs debates on the Diet floor or in commit-
tee meetings are merely charades. In the past, opposition
techniques have taken the form of harassment. A favorite
tactic is to boycott a session in which a bill is passed,
then charge the conservatives with dictatorial undemocratic
politics in hopes that public opinion will be aroused. In
this manner, the government will get its way at the expense
of a little tarnish on its image.
In a final note, J. A. A. Stockwin had this observation
to make regarding the Japanese political scene:
...a model of alternating party politics has hitherto
been singularly inappropriate to the Japanese context.
Voting patterns have been stable rather than swinging,
and so far as past experience at least indicates, the
electorate can be seen as consisting of a number of ex-
ploitable segments . Each segment is the actual or po-
tential clientele of a given political party (or set of
candidates). When that segment has been fully exploited
by a party, it is difficult for the party to progress
any further, and, losing the momentum of its appeal, it
is likely to begin to decline. As the JSP, and to a
lesser extent the LDP, have lost electoral support, so
other parties have moved in to exploit the situation
thus created. However, this has meant a proliferation
of opposition parties. Given the existing electoral
system, each of them is able to get some representation
from its limited "segment" of national support. This
makes it extremely difficult for any one party to chal-
lenge the LDP effectively, while the prospects of their
combining to defeat the government party are not good so
long as personal, idealogical and historical differences




Earlier in the chapter, it was stated that the LDP, the
business community and the central bureaucracy combine to
form the conservative leadership in Japan. This section
will discuss the foreign policy roles of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, the two most important bureaucratic actors influ-
encing foreign affairs.
Before examining these two powerful ministries it is
important to understand some general characteristics of the
Japanese bureaucracy.
Although the civil servants wield a great deal of power,
they only make recommendations to the politicians of the rul-
ing party (that is, the Cabinet ministers, who are political
appointees, and Diet and party committees). The bureaucrats
are essential to the decision-making process because of the
wealth of information and experience they possess. They also
provide some degree of continuity between Cabinet reorganiza-
tions .
A career in the civil service is highly regarded in Japan
and some writers have characterized the bureaucracy as elit-
ist. Competition for positions is keen and many young men
entering the government are highly motivated to serve their
country. Prestige is enhanced by the widely-held view that
civil servants are neutral and impartial when compared with
party politicians
.
Upon retirement from government service, many high-level
bureaucrats "descend from Heaven" to enter private industry
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and public corporations. A smaller but significant number
run for political office, mostly with LDP endorsement. By
following these paths the civil servants remain within the
Japanese power structure. The movement of bureaucrats into
the private sector has been ciriticized as being corrupt,
since it enables private business to "reward" a civil ser-
vant who has been helpful while in office. On the other
hand, it is argued that this transfer keeps knowledgeable
people in the upper echelons of the economy.
It is clear, then, that the traditionally-respected
bureaucracy in Japan plays an important role in policy for-
mulation. A closer look at two bureaucratic actors follows.
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
It is generally agreed that in Japan the economic
ministries such as Finance and International Trade and In-
dustry (MIT I) are the most powerful. The foreign office has
lost head-to-head battles with MITI over Japanese overseas
policy, sometimes referred to as "trading company diplomacy."
With each put-down, the foreign ministry suffers a loss of
prestige. It also is frequently criticized for being sub-
servient to the American point of view. These are some of
the reasons why fewer men are taking the entrance examina-
tions than in the past and morale has sagged.-3 But the
foreign ministry has by no means been liminated from parti-
cipating in international affairs.
It is difficult to determine the exact importance of
MFA in policy making. There are writers who state that the
ministry dominates this area, while others claim its role is
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marginal. It seems that there is no absolute truth in this
matter, since MFA's recommendations are accepted or rejected
depending upon the nature of the issue. In routine cases,
the bureaucracy will make incremental changes, to which the
politicians and outside pressure groups will give little
notice. If the matter is politically sensitive, however,
the ministry's rationally-based guidance may or may not be
followed. One expert noted that "An important tendancy that
relates to the distinction between routine and controversial
situations is that the number of participants within the
ministry tends to be in inverse proportion to that of parti-
cipants outside the ministry. In routine cases, relatively
more ministry bureaucrats and relatively fewer outsiders
participate, whereas in controversial cases, the opposite
tends to be true."^
Observers emphasize the importance of middle-level
officials in the Foreign Office. Division heads in particu-
lar are said to be the men who are most heavily leaned upon.
The upper echelons spend much of their time testifying in
the Diet and tending to administrative affairs and thus are
unable to stay current on all issues. Because the division
head and his assistant have an up-to-date working knowledge
of the situation, their guidance is usually endorsed by
higher-level bureaucrats whether the situation is routine or
not
.
Bureaucratic jealousy and myopia are factors both inside
and outside the Japanese Foreign Ministry. As noted earlier,
MFA clashes often with MIT I, which it feels infringes upon
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its territory. While MITI is concerned with business aspects
of foreign relations, MFA looks at the strategic and global
factors. The bureaus and divisions within the Foreign Office
also tend to be biased in their outlooks; the China division
head urges a "forward-looking policy" toward the P.R.C., just
as the First North American division head is sympathetic to
U.S. viewpoints. ^
Although the mechanisms are present, there seems to
be no ministry-wide policy coordination. The research and
analysis department of the Foreign Ministry is tasked with
comprehensive policy planning, but jurisdictional disagree-
ments with other bureaus apparently hinder its work. The
treaties bureau has picked up some of the policy coordination
responsibility. Although it does not involve itself with
policy making, the treaties bureau gives highly-respected
legal counsel and advice on issues which are often beyond
its purview.
2
. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI )
MITI is the smallest of the six organizations that
make up the "economic bureaucracy" (MITI, the Ministries of
Finance, Agriculture and Forestry, Transportation, and Con-
struction, and the Economic Planning Agency). MITI ' s influ-
ence in Japanese economic matters is a complex and controver-
sial subject both at home and abroad. While it is called a
"department store of government" by some Japanese, few would
complain about the country's post-war economic recovery, in
which MITI played a big role. Meanwhile, foreigners have
labelled MITI "the corporate headquarters of Japan, Inc."
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It is important to see how this powerful ministry effects
Japanese foreign policy.
MITI was established in 19^9 "to formulate plans
cncerning fundamental policies for production, distribution,
consumption and foreign trading of commodities under its
jurisdiction." MITI ' s real power lies in the extension by
the Diet of this basic regulation over numerous other com-
mercial activities. MITI controls legally by its "license
and approval authority." Even more influential, however, is
the ministry's right to provide "administrative guidance" in
the form of recommendations, requests, and advice. It must
be understood that MITI ' s "guidance" has no legal binding.
The one aspect of administrative guidance which most
effects Japan's trading partners is the "voluntary restric-
tion." If Japan, under foreign pressure decides to decrease
an export item MITI will decide how much each manufacturer
will cut back.
Within the Japanese economic bureaucracy there is no
single coordinating agency, such as the Office of Management
and Budget in the U.S. Therefore,, each ministry jealously
watches over its doman and adds to it if an opening appears.
Behind Finance, MITI is generally regarded as the second
most powerful and prestigious ministry in the government.
MITI may orchestrate the vital trade balance, but its fre-
quent adversary, Finance, handles international monetary
policy and the budget. Still, MITI seems to have more of a
voice in overseas policy.
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Due to their parochial interests, MITI and the For-
eign Office argue over many issues. MFA, having its eye on
world-wide political as well as economic relationships, takes
a predominantly liberal, open-door position on the area of
trade. Since it has no natural constituency it may follow
this "internationalist" line without fear of losing support.
MITI, on the other hand, being responsive to the interests
of the business community, has been traditionally protec-
tionist on trade matters. It has long promoted increased
trade with the P.R.C., clashing with the Foreign Ministry.
MITI is not a formal actor in the official foreign
policy decision-making process. But because Japan's over-
seas policy has been so dominated by economics, MITI's trade
decisions have, in many cases, determined the nature of the
relations between Japan and other countries. Although not
all-powerful, MITI is one of a number of important partici-
pants in Japanese foreign affairs.
D. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The economic community is the third member of Japan's
conservative leadership. The relationship between govern-
ment and business in Japan is unique in the capitalist world.
"The business and political elites are linked together by
their common social and educational backgrounds, residence
in the capital, a thick web of personal ties, long experi-
ence in working together to promote the reconstruction of
the country, mutual dependence and shared values and goals."
Because of this close bond, it is essential to understand
big business' effect on foreign policy.
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The Japanese economic community can be divided into three
groups or layers. Onthe top are the leaders of the major
business organizations (zaikai ) , such as the Federation of
Economic Organizations (FEO, or Keidanren ) . The second
echelon consists of the industrial interests ( gyokai ) , and
the third division is made up of the individual corporations
(kigyo)
.
Unquestionably, the zaikai is the most infuential econo-
mic layer. As Prime Minister Ikeda once stated, "The gov-
ernment is the captain and the zaikai the compass of the
ship." H ^ These business leaders determine the basic trends
of the Japanese economy and thus the nation.
The FEO is the voice of big business and is the dominant
force in the economic arena. All major corporations and fi-
nancial institutions are represented (over 100 major nation-
al trade associations and more than 750 large corporations).
The FEO's primary goal is to keep close tabs on all sectors
of the business community and resolve conflicts among its
members. The President of the FEO has been called the "Prime
Minister of the zaikai " and his "cabinet" meetings are often
attended by governmental ministers and other high-level offi-
cials. The FEO has 20 standing and special committees which
are in constant communication with the LDP, members of the
Diet and the bureaucracy.
Although business does represent the ruling party's prime
benefactor, it would be incorrect to assume that money is the
community's sole source of power. For the most part, busi-
ness concerns in Japan do not function as pressure groups.
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As discussed earlier, government and big business think very
much alike and work together for a common goal— continued
economic growth under a capitalist system. They consult
closely on matters such as the national budget, taxation and
trade
.
The business community has resorted to pressure group
tactics in the past when warranted. In the early 1950 's the
socialists were gaining ground on the two feuding conserva-
tive parties and the zaikai pressed for a merger. The Lib-
eral-Democratic Party resulted. Segments of the business
world also use pressure to obtain favorable treatment (such
as rice growers urging higher rice tariffs). By and large,
however, the nature of the government-business relationship
is quite the opposite of adversary.
Presently, both government and big business agree that
clost economic and political relations with the U.S. are
necessary in order to attain their common goals. The China
issue divided the economic community somewhat. While some
of the individual companies had much to gain from closer
P.R.C. relations in the 1960's and early 1970's, the zaikai
felt that the overall long-term interests of Japan would be
best served by going along with the U.S. policy of a near
economic boycott of China. Obviously, pro-American business
leaders lost some credibility after the "Nixon shock" of
1971 and were embarassed by the U.S. "double-cross."
Like the other members of the conservative leadership,
business is powerful but not omnipotent. "It's like a game
of paper, scissors and rock," said Kono Keizo, a vice speaker
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of the Upper House. "The businessmen have influence over the
politicians, the politicians control the bureaucracy, and the
bureaucrats keep the businessmen in line. It's a natural
system of checks and balances." 3
E. PUBLIC OPINION
The relationship of Japanese public opinion and foreign
policy is not easily understood. Because Japan is a demo-
cratic and open society, the people possess the means to make
their views known to the government. But the use of this in-
fluence and the government's response to it are complex.
The Japanese people ordinarily do not become excited
over political matters. Thus, while a survey may find that
78% of the respondants favored Policy A, it may not reveal
that most of them would do nothing to encourage its imple-
mentation. Occasionally, however, the public does become
aroused over an issue, as it did in I960 over the renewal
of the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty.
Surveys also show that foreign policy is traditionally
less important to voters than domestic affairs. In a Decem-
ber 1969 poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun , three-quarters of
the people questioned emphasized domestic issues (inflation,
taxes, etc.) and only 14. 5% cited foreign policy and defense
kli
matters most important.
Japanese are avid newspaper readers and are among the
best-informed people in the world. Consequently, the press
is a very influential factor in Japanese politics. The news-
papers aggressively strive to keep the public current on all
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issues. Although they all tend to be neutral in party poli-
tics, the Asahi leans slightly further left than the others.
The LDP probably did not greatly concern itself with the
public viewpoint when its majority in the Diet was overwhelm-
ing. For example, despite the i960 riots which caused the
cancellation of President Eisenhower's scheduled visit, the
conservatives rammed the treaty ratification through the
Lower House and the Protest quickly subsided. The situation
is changing. The LDP's support is deteriorating and one can
assume that the ruling party will alter its policies to ac-
comodate public desires in order to pick up voters.
Some observers think that many Japanese are just "letting
off steam" when they protest against pollution, overcrowded
cities and other side effects of the LDP's industrialization
policy, and that these people will, in the end, vote for the
party which has so markedly improved the quality of life in
Japan. The LDP interpreted the December 1977 House of Coun-
cillors election as such a vote of confidence.
Although the evidence is not conclusive, it does appear
that Japanese leaders have become more appreciative of public
opinion over the past twenty years. The increased number of
public opinion polls, both by the mass media and government,




IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS
The previous chapters have discussed Japanese foreign
policy perspectives and actors. This chapter will look at
the development of U.S.-P.R.C. relations from 19*19 to 1977.
Later chapters will examine the viewpoints of the various
interest groups in Japan towards the different steps in the
evolution of Sino-American policy.
Our relationship with China is primarily based upon
a long background of religious, cultural and humanitar-
ian association. . .There is a foundation, and we believe
a stable and lasting foundation, of friendship between
the people of China and the people of the U . S .... History
will never judge that we have been motivated by anything
other than a desire to serve what we honestly believe to
be the welfare of the Chinese people. 5
These words were spoken in 1950 by John Foster Dulles,
who later became Secretary of State and a very important
China policy-maker. In the early 1950 ' s many Americans be-
lieved in the myth of U.S. -Chinese freindship which Dulles
espoused and could not comprehend how China could accept
communism and thus reject the U.S.
Contrary to Dulles' words, the record shows that over
the years, U.S. interest in China has been economic, reli-
gious or political. The lure of the potentially vast China
market has been on the minds of American businessmen since
the late 18th Century. The Chinese masses also attracted
a great many U.S. missionaries who sought to introduce not
only Christianity but, in addition, American political insti-
tutions. And politically it was expedient for the U.S. to
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align itself with China in the 1930's and early 1940's to
oppose Japanese expansion.
For their part, the Chinese have not excluded the U.S.
from the anti-foreign feelings which have traditionally dom-
inated their international outlook. This Chinese resentment
of foreign meddling in their domestic affairs runs deeper
than the ideological conflict between democracy and communism
Therefore, Americans had no basis upon which to feel be-
trayed by the Chinese when a communist government was formal-
ly established in 1949.
When the communists, led by Mao Tse-tung, established
control of the China mainland in 19^9, the Truman administra-
tion sought to diengage the U.S. from the Chinese civil war.
Three inter-related issues faced the U.S.: diplomatic recog-
nition of the Peking government, admission to the United Na-
tions and relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan.
Two general philosophies existed in the U.S. regarding
diplomatic recognition. The Jeffersonian approach held that
the U.S. should establish relations with any government
which was in firm control and represented the will of the
people. The Wilsonian philosophy was that recognition im-
plied approval of a government's actions. The Truman ad-
ministration, through Secretary of State Dean Acheson, cited
Jeffersonian reasons in September 19^9 for adopting the po-
sition that the U.S. would not extend diplomatic recognition
to the P.R. C.
Many influential Americans were opposed to recognizing
the communist government in Peking. The issue was largely
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partisan, and the Republicans insisted that establishing re-
lations with the P.R.C. meant abandonment of our war-time
ally, Chiang Kai-shek. They also claimed that it would rep-
resent appeasement to the world communist movement. This
"China bloc" in Congress was supported in its anti-Peking
stance by the "China lobby," a group of Nationalist offi-
cials, their public relations agents and anti-communist
Americans
.
While these pro-Tiawan forces represented a minority
viewpoint in Washington, they succeeded in arousing wide-
spread anti-communist sentiment in the U.S. Even though the
liberal press was generally in favor of establishing diplo-
matic relations, public opinion in 19^9 and the early 1950's
was such that recognition of the P.R.C. was politically
impractical.
The fledgling Peking government exacerbated American
hostile feelings by pursuing a vigorous anti-imperialist
campaign against the West and by harassing consular offi-
cials in China. The communists were still attempting to
consolidate their internal power during this period. They
stirred Chinese nationalistic sentiments by emphasizing the
threat of U.S. imperialism. The newborn P.R.C. *s foreign
policy was guided by two basic doctrines—alliance with the
U.S.S.R. and opposition to the Western imperialists.
Closely tied to the question of recognition was the issue
of admitting the Peking government to the U.S. Both the
Nationalists and the Chinese communists were using the U.N.
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as a forum from which to argue their cases for legitimacy
(the communists using Moscow as a mouthpiece).
The American government, in keeping with its policy of
non-recognition of Peking, backed the Taipei regime. The
Soviet Union, in turn, supported the cause of the Peking
government. In an apparent protest over lack of admission
of the mainland government, the Soviet ambassador walked out
of the U.N. in January 1950.
Still, the P.R.C. did little to further its own cause.
It isolated itself from the world community by stepping up
its anti-Imperialist propaganda, recognizing Ho Chi Minh's
government in Vietnam and continuing to abuse U.S. consular
property. The Soviet Union's refusal to be patient and fol-
low parliamentary means to secure a U.N. seat for Peking hurt
the joint communist effort. By taking this high-handed
approach, many nations saw the world communist movement as
being against representative government.
The third immediate issue which faced the U.S. government
in late 19^9 and early 1950 was the relationship with the
government on Taiwan. Prevailing opinion within the admini-
stration was that the U.S. should in no way become involved
in a civil war which had already been decided. Truman, sup-
ported by his Joint Chiefs, opposed sending any military
assistance to the Nationalists. In January 1950 Acheson ex-
cluded Taiwan (and Korea) from the strategic line that he
said the U.S. should be prepared to defend against communist
aggression in the Western Pacific.
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The administration opponents claimed that it was against
the American way to abandon a loyal ally. Alongside the sen-
timentalists, others argued that under the new Asian situa-
tion it was strategically important for the U.S. to keep
Taiwan from going under.
Thus, in the spring of 1950, the U.S. under Truman, en-
cumbered by Congress and public opinion, followed a policy
of "no involvement" in China's civil war. The emerging phe-
nomenon of McCarthyism and the Korean conflict snuffed out
any hope of U.S. accomodation with the P.R.C.
When the North Koreans attacked across the 38th parallel
on June 25, 1950, a chain of events was started which froze
Sino-American relations for two decades.
In the U.S. the thrust was taken as world communism on
the march—the perils of NSC-68 were coming true. Whereas
months earlier Korea had been omitted from the American
strategic defense perimeter, the Truman administration now
felt that North Korea threatened U.S. national security.
When the President committed U.S. troops and supplies to the
defense of South Korea the public rallied behind him. Simul-
taneously, the U.S. government reversed its stand on the
Twaiwan issue and dispatched the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the
Formosa Straits to prevent a communist attack. Chou En-lai
denounced Truman's action as agression against the territory
of China and Mao Tse-tung is reported to have believed that
the U.S. "openly exposed its imperialist face."
When the U.N. troops halted the North Korean advance and
began moving northward, the new objective became the
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unification of Korea under a democratic government. As the
North Koreans retreated, the Chinese issued numerous private
and public warnings that they would not stand idly by. The
threats were ignored and less than three weeks after the
Americans pushed across the 38th parallel, U.S. and Chinese
troops clashed. In late November 1950 the communists launched
a devastating attach which eventually forced the U.N. forces
south of the 38th parallel.
Although still a matter of dispute, it seems clear that
the P.R.C.'s intervention was primarily a defensive move
rather than a conscious step toward world communist domina-
tion. The Chinese were convinced that an American-dominated
government directly across their border was a threat to their
national security.
By February 1951 the communist forces were stopped and,
once again, U.N. troops moved northward. Against the wishes
of his field commander, General MacArthur, President Truman
decided not to advance the fight into North Korea, thus com-
mitting himself to a holding action. The administration now
sought a negotiated settlement plus a U.N. condemnation of
the P.R.C. as an aggressor nation. The General Assembly did
approve the U.S. resolution in February, and in that same
month, the U.S. concluded a military assistance pact with
Taiwan, culminating the policy reversal of the Truman govern-
ment. By June, fighting was stalemated around the 38th paral-
lel and the Chinese agreed to a cease-fire.
The negotiations dragged on for two years before an ar-
mistice was signed in June 1953, three months following
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Stalin's death. Hostilities broke out repeatedly during the
negotiations with both sides sustaining heavy losses. In
the end, however, a direct all-out clash between the U.S.
and the P.R.C. was averted.
Whatever friendship between the two countries had existed
prior to 1950 disappeared with the Korean conflict. To the
Chinese communists, Americans were viewed as barbarians who
threatened their way of life. Americans saw the Chinese as
mindless, aggressive hordes under Soviet domination. Hold-
ing these bitter feelings, the U.S. refused to consider
normalized relations with China and the Peking government
had no interest in improved ties.
During this period the effects of McCarthyism also left
a long-lasting impression on American China policy. It em-
bodied all the emotional Cold War fears and fixed in people's
minds the view that accommodation was appeasement. Moreover,
it depleted the State Department of most of its China experts
and greatly limited foreign policy flexibility. It was to
take years for the effects of McCarthyism to fade from the
policy arena.
The chief architect of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's
Far East policy was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
He commanded the President's full confidence. Dulles was a
fervent anti-communist who firmly believed that communism,
or even neutralism, was immoral. He shared the China bloc's
convictions that the U.S. must hold the line against commu-
nist expansion in the Western Pacific. This one man's phi-
losophy was to play a vital role in Sino-American relations
during the 1950 's.
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U.S. fear of Chinese communist expansion seemed to be re-
inforced by developments: in Indochina in the early 1950 's.
In 195^ the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietminh began a massive assault
on the French stronghold of Dienbienphu. The alarmed U.S.
government, amidst reports of Chinese army involvement, em-
barked on an all-out campaign to convince the American peo-
ple of the danger posed to the Free World by this expression
of Sino-Soviet expansion. However, Eisenhower did not want
to intervene militarily without allied support and, not find-
ing it, had to be content with sending supplies to the doomed
French forces. It now appears probably that although the
Vietminh did admittedly receive aid from Russia and China,
there was no troop involvement.
The major powers met in Geneva in April 1954 to negotiate
the fate of Korea and Vietnam. The American and Chinese posi-
tions remained unequivocal on the Koren issue and these nego-
tiations collapsed. The conference then turned to Indochina
and the U.S. declined to take an active part in the matter.
The French had little choice but to admit defeat in Vietnam
and withdraw completely. The outcome of the Geneva settle-
ment caused the U.S. to again actively seek a collective de-
fense treaty to prevent further communist aggression in
Southeast Asea. This time Dulles was successful and in
September 1954, the U.S., Great Britain, France, Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan signed
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the forerunner
of SEATO. Furthermore, the U.S. made a commitment to provide
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military support to the South Vietnamese government. The
Peking government condemned the new treaty as hostile to the
P.R.C. and interference in the internal affairs of Asian
countries
.
The primary issue between the U.S. and China remained
Taiwan. In August 195^, the communists attached the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Strategically unimportant, this
small group of islands was a symbolic stepping stone for both
the communists and the Nationalists. The U.S., while re-
straining Chiang Kai-shek from an all-out counter-attack
across the straits, pledged to support the Nationalists
against a communist invasion. In December, the U.S. and
Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty which authorized the
U.S. to put men and equipment on Taiwan and the Pescadores
Islands. The Chinese communists continued to shell Quemoy
and in January 1955 stepped up their activity by raiding the
Tachen Islands. The U.S. Congress responded by endorsing
Eisenhower's Formosa Resolution, which granted him condition-
al authority to employ U.S. armed forces for the protection
of Taiwan, the Pescadores and other "closely related locali-
ties." The President also took this opportunity to suggest
that he would use tactical nuclear weapons if war broke out
in the Par East.
Three months later, in April 1955, Premier Chou En-lai
announced that the P.R.C. was willing to enter into negotia-
tions with the U.S. to "discuss the question of relaxing
tension in the Far East and especially the question of re-
laxing tension in the Taiwan area." The reasons for this
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policy shift are not clear, but the Soviet Union was also
following a more conciliatory line toward the West following
Stalin's death. As an informal truce descended upon the
Taiwan Straits, the governments agreed to ambassadorial level
talks in Geneva.
The talks yielded results, as both nations returned cap-
tured servicemen. The U.S. and China remained deadlocked,
however, over the crucial issue of Taiwan. Peking claimed
it was an internal China problem and Washington continued
to support the legitimacy of the Nationalist government.
Throughout 1956 and 1957 China seemed to follow a more
restrained foreign policy. At home, the Chinese leaders
seemed to be less repressive as they implemented the "hundred
folowers" campaign. U.S. policy-makers, however, stood
firmly beside their policy of denying the legitimacy of the
Chinese communists. Dulles even refused the P.R.C.'s offer
of a journalist exchange.
1958 saw the return of militancy to Chinese foreign af-
fairs. In late 1957 Mao Tse-tung, perhaps heady over improv-
ing Soviet rocket technology, declared that the east wind was
no prevailing over the west. The country was also undergoing
the Great Leap Forward. In order to re-direct the people's
attention from the new demands being placed on them, the
Chinese leadership harped on the threat of western imperialism
For whatever reasons, in August 1958, the communists once
again stepped up the action in the straits by shelling and
blockading Quemoy . Radio Peking warned that the mainlanders
were going to "smash the American paper tiger and liberate
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Taiwan." Eisenhower once again declared that the U.S. was
prepared to defend Taiwan. Within days, the Chinese commu-
nists opted for the conference table. It has been speculated
that Peking backed down because the Soviet Union, realizing
its strategic inferiority, would not give full support to the
Chinese "adventure." Just as in 1955, the U.S. and the P.R.C.
would not compromise their Taiwan stances and the talks were
inconclusive
.
During the remaining years of the 1950' s, Peking followed
a foreign policy which alienated the American people. Signs
of the Sino-Soviet split were growing and the Chinese were
declaring themselves the true heirs of Marxism-Leninism. In
contrast to the Soviet Union, they were ready to support all
revolutionary movements against capitalism. Peking put this
policy into operation by opening aiding the Pathet Lao in
Laos and backing Ho Chi Minn's drive to liberate South Viet-
nam.
The U.S. remained committed to a policy of isolating the
P.R.C. Along, except for a hesitant Japan, the U.S. main-
tained an economic boycott of mainland China. Every year,
the U.S. opposed the entry .of the P.R.C. into the United
Nations. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Walter
Robertson, the U.S. must stand up against "the fanatical,
aggressive, hostile and threatening International Communist
regime of Peiping, an implacable enemy dedicated to the de-






I960 saw the election of a Democratic candidate as Presi-
dent of the U.S. Although there were some signs that John
F. Kennedy felt that relations with China were too rigid, the
new administration believed that public opinion still would
not support accommodation. Kennedy's appointment of Dean
Rusk as Secretary of State solidified the U.S. government's
hardline against Peking.
The new President clashed first with the P.R.C. over
Laos, where both countries sought to prevent each other from
gaining influence. The U.S. backed the neutralist forces,
while the Chinese supported the Pathet Lao, which seemed
poised for a communist takeover. In April 1961, the rival
forces agreed to a cease-fire and a 14-nation conference was
called to negotiate a settlement. After a year, an agree-
ment was reached by the signatories, including the U.S. and
China, that Laos would be independent and neutral. Anxious
to avoid a direct confrontation, the two powers had accepted
a compromise setting up Laos as a non-aligned state.
In 1962, perhaps as a test of the new administration,
the Chinese communists once again belligerently stated their
intent to liberate Taiwan. They began to concentrate their
forces across the straits in Fukien. Kennedy did not hesi-
tate in supporting the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of comitting
the U.S. to the defense of Taiwan. He also added that "We
are opposed to the use of force in the area. The purposes
of the U.S.... are peaceful and defensive." The President's
words restrained both the communists and the Nationalists
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and a crisis was avoided. Taiwan remained an intractable
issue, however.
Two events of late 1962 further solidified the opposing
positions of the U.S. and the P.R.C. In the Sino-Indian
war, the U.S. gave prompt military assistance to India in
what it believed was an effort to thwart communist expansion.
Peking seemed to live up to its stated goal of only reclaim-
ing borderlands when, from a position of clear strength, it
unexpectedly announced a cease-fire and called for negotia-
tions. The second event, the Cuban Missile Crisis, saw the
Soviet Union accede to U.S. demands of strategic missile re-
moval from Cuba. For this surrender, the Russian leaders
were mercilessly attached by Peking. Although relations
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union seemed to improve after
this incident, China's position vis-a-vis the two superpowers
declined.
In the early 1960's Washington was confused over the
growing rift between the two communist giants. While the
polemical warfare raged on between Peking and Moscow, neither
side disavowed their military alliance. The prevailing feel-
ing among U.S. leaders was that the split did not make com-
munism any less menacing. In fact, a reckless, isolated
China may have been more of a threat to expand in Asia.
Meanwhile, the matter of Vietnam was simmering. U.S.
support for the government of South Vietnam grew out of a
conviction that China was the real enemy behind the commu-
nist insurrection. When U.S. planes began bombing North
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Vietnam in February 1965, the P.R.C. repeatedly warned that
if the North were invaded by combat troops, China would be
forced to enter the hostilities. Although Peking provided
military and moral aid to North Vietnam, it restrained it-
self from sending troops across the frontier. Without direct
Chinese involvement, the Johnson administration could not
reason that U.S. forces were in Vietnam to counter Chinese
communist expansion. Therefore the U.S. emphasized that it
had to uphold its obligations under the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty.
The Chinese continued to strenuously oppose American
intervention in Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists were meddling
in Asian affairs and, by their presence, were threatening
Chinese security. Washington dismissed the idea that Peking
could be worried about self-defense. Governmental leaders
were so preoccupied with containing Chinese communism and
maintaining peace in Asia that they could not perceive that
China felt insecure with hostile American forces in Korea,
Taiwan and Vietnam and Soviet troops on the northern border.
Domestic events in China prevented a warming of relations
with the U.S. In 1964, the Chinese exploded their first
atomic device, proudly joing the nuclear club. The danger
of a Chinese nuclear attack appeared remote, but the Ameri-
can people could not escape a new sense of foreboding.
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which began
in 1965, exhibited to the world a confused, disarrayed China.
As Mao sought to rejuvenate the spirit of communism in China,
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the turmoil created a shifting, kaleidoscopic picture to the
West. The People's Daily alternated bellicose outbursts with
hints of possible accommodation. These events seemed to make
the U.S. goal of Asian stability more remote.
Once the Vietnam peace talks commenced in May 1968, the
feeling began to grow in Washington that a reappraisal of
U.S. Far Eastern policy was required. Communism in China
was accepted as more than a temporary phase, and the strength
of China's nationalism was recognized. This more pragmatic
outlook, however, did not free the U.S. from the network of
security treaties and commitments it maintained for the con-
tainment of the communist movement. Further, the P.R.C.'s
continued development of nuclear weapons highlighted the
Sino-American rivalry. As President Richard M. Nixon took
office in January 1969 there was no indication that a fresh
approach to China was in the making.
Richard Nixon's pre-Presidential record had a distinctly
hawkish, anti-communist tone to it. Immediately following
his election, no signs were given that he had changed his
position.
Yet, within four months of assuming office, the new
President appeared to display a conciliatory mood towards
the P.R.C. Secretary of State William Rogers stated that
the U.S. would take the initiative to reestablish more nor-
mal relations with Communist China. Then, in July 1969, the
State Department eased travel and customs restrictions for
U.S. citizens traveling to China. Although these steps were
small, they were significant.
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For their part, the Chinese greeted Nixon's election by
calling for renewed ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. The U.S.
agreed, but the Peking government backed out at the last
minute, ostensibly because of the defection of a Chinese
diplomat to the U.S. It seems more likely that internal
political power struggles caused China to renew the tradi-
tional attacks on the U.S. Nonetheless, the invitation did
not go unnoticed by Washington, and the State Department
calmly stated that it would stand ready to reopen talks
whenever the Chinese changed their minds
.
Then, in July 1969, on the island of Guam, the U.S.
President enunciated what became known as the "Nixon Doctrine."
He announced a phased withdrawl of U.S. troops from Vietnam
and, while reiterating U.S. interests in Asia, stated that
the U.S. must avoid future military entanglements in that re-
gion. Additionally, U.S. allies in Asia were to assume more
responsibility for their own protection against communism.
Whether the reason was to placate American public opinion or
to move closer to China, the prospect of a decreased U.S.
military presence in their backyard must have greatly re-
lieved Chinese leaders.
The 1969 border clashes between China and the Soviet
Union brought home to the U.S. the severity of the Sino-
Soviet conflict. The deepening cleavage opened up options
for U.S. foreign policy with the two communist powers. Al-
though Washington stated that it would remain completely
neutral, the government realized that on a case-by-case
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basis it might be able to apply leverage to promote its own
interests
.
In light of its conflict with the Soviet Union, China's
leaders must have seen that they could benefit from improved
relations with the U.S. During the late 1960's there was
considerable fear in China that the Soviet Union would use
the Czechoslovakian model in China. Warming conditions be-
tween the U.S. and China would possible restrain Russia.
Aside from strengthening the country's position relative
to the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership probably realized
that there were further potential rewards for improving re-
lations with the U.S. Among these were a seat in the United
Nations, better relations with Japan, a lifting of the U.S.
economic boycott, greater worldwide prestige and, concomi-
tantly, a weakening of Taiwan's position. Conversely, one
disadvantage would be a loss of credibility as the avowed
leader of the "Third World."
Even though the U.S. remained committed to Taiwan and
opposed to entry of Peking into the U.N. , there were some
positive notes in 1970. At China's suggestion, ambassadorial
talks were again renewed in Poland. The State Department
also announced a partial lifting of the American economic
blockade of China by approving the exchange of nonstrategic
goods
.
A major breakthrough in U.S.-P.R.C. relations came in
July 1971, when President Nixon announced his intention to
visit China. This development "shocked" many of the United
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States' Asian allies, especially Japan, since it had been
accomplished without their consultation. That same year the
U.S. altered its position on U.N. membership for the P.R.C.,
and the mainland government was seated on the Security Coun-
cil. Since the U.S. still maintained diplomatic relations
with Taiwan, ambassadors could not be exchanged and the two
countries set up liaison offices to conduct official affairs.
Since these events transpired six years ago, Sino-Ameri-
can relations have been in a holding pattern. Although Japan
normalized diplomatic relations with China in 1972, there are
yet some major stumbling blocks to formal U.S.-P.R.C. relations
More than any other issue, Taiwan stands between China
and the U.S. Peking demands that the U.S. abrogate the mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan, sever diplomatic relations and
remove all American troops from the island. In the Shanghai
communique of February 1972, the U.S. acknowledged that Tai-
wan is a part of China and "reaffirmed its interest in a
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese
themselves." ^ The U.S. also affirmed its ultimate objective
of the removal of all American forces and military installa-
tions from Taiwan.
The U.S. would like to improve relations with China by
moving away from a commitment to Taiwan, but such a shift
might cause consternation among its Asian allies, most notably
Japan. Following on the heels of the American disengagement
from Vietnam and the announced troop withdrawal from South
Korea, the abandonment of Taiwan could seriously erode confi-
dence in other U.S. commitments. Presently, there seems to
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be no pressing need for the U.S. to run these risks by agree-
ing to Peking's demands. But should the Chinese communists
decide to step up pressure on the U.S. to get off the fence,
a serious crisis would face American leaders. The Chinese,
realizing that such an ultimatum might be counter-productive,
currently appear to be satisfied in playing a waiting game.
Another hindrance to improved Sino-American relations is
the Soviet Union. From Peking's angle, the view is clear.
In the likely event that the Sino-Soviet conflict continues
with its present intensity, the Chinese would benefit great-
ly by warmer relations with the U.S. The perspective from
Washington is quite different. U.S. foreign policy is still
shaped largely by its confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Given the present strategic balance between the two super-
powers, a much closer U.S.-P.R.C. relationship could be de-
stablizing and cause the Soviets to take drastic action to
improve their position. It is in the United States' inter-
ests to seek better relations with the two communist giants,
_
but not one at the expense of the other. The Sino-Soviet
conflict puts the U.S. in an advantageous, if not ticklish,
position to pursue this goal.
A third hindrance to improved U.S.-P.R.C. relations is
the issue of arms control. From its position of strategic
nuclear sufficiency, the U.S. sees the significant improvement
of any foreign government's nuclear force as against its
interests. It does appear that the nuclear balance will be
de-stabilized when China's might, coupled with either the
79

American or Soviet forces, substantially tips the scales.
Conversely, Peking sees no advantage to limiting its own
nuclear capability. Not until the Chinese believe they have
a credible second strike capability might they become inter-
ested in negotiating arms control.
Economic relations are another matter facing the U.S. and
China. In a world of increasing economic interdependence,
the U.S., as a trading nation, requires access to foreign
markets and natural resources. China could supply both of
these in return for American technology. The present Chinese
communist theme, however, is self-reliance. Bitter memories
of past foreign encroachment make China reluctant to accept
foreign loans and investments or enter into close economic
relationships
.
Lastly, it must be remembered that the governmental and
economic systems of the U.S. and the P.R.C. are incompatible.
Since the Fifth People's Conference in Peking in February
1978, a further rapprochement with the U.S. and other Western
nations seems to be indicated in the policy statements of
the Chinese political leaders. The Chinese seem to be willing
to risk their possible loss of prestige with some Third World
countries, whom they claim to lead against the American and
Soviet hegemonists. This latest dilemma facing the Chinese,
as with every other choice which the Chinese were obliged to
make in the historic evolution of their policies towards the
U.S., is of extreme importance to every interest group in
Japan. The following chapters will examine the viewpoints
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of the various policy actors as they watched the development
of U.S.-P.R.C. relations— first before 1971 and, subsequently,
for the contemporary period.
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V. EVOLVING INTEREST GROUP POLICIES REGARDING
U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS: THE BACKGROUND
Chapter Three discussed the Japanese foreign policy roles
of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, the opposition parties,
the central bureaucracy, the economic community and public
opinion. In this chapter the background (1949-1971) for the
current attitudes of these interest groups toward key issues
in U.S.-P.R.C. relations will be developed.
A. THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)
Although the LDP was not founded until October 1955, its
first leaders had figured prominently in postwar Japanese
policy-making as members of the rival conservative parties,
the Liberals and the Democrats. Foremost among these leaders
was Shigeru Yoshida who, as head of the Liberal Party and
Prime Minister of the government from 19^8-195^, steered his
country to a close relationship with the U.S. because he be-
lieved that it was Japan's only rational avenue to national
security and economic recovery.
When the American occupation of Japan ended in May 1952,
the ruling Liberal Party was free to formulate an independent
Japanese foreign policy. In fact, most of this freedom had
been forfeited when the conservative leadership opted for
military and economic ties with the U.S. Under Yoshida's
leadership and backed by big business, the Liberals attached
high priority to domestic economic recovery, which led to
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the rejection of large-scale rearmament, which, in turn, led
to dependence upon the U.S. for security.
In 1952, the U.S. and China were at bitter odds with one
another over the important issues of Korea and Taiwan. In
aligning Japan with the American-led Western bloc, the Lib-
eral Party placed the country in an adversary relationship
with the P.R.C. This arrangement was one of utility from
the Japanese viewpoint, since they did not see China as a
real threat. Although Yoshida would have preferred a more
flexible China policy, under pressure from the U.S. the Lib-
erals concluded a peace treaty with Nationalist Taiwan, rec-
ognizing it as the de jure government of China.
In Korea, the Japanese had more at stake than appeasing
U.S. desires. The conservatives felt that a North Korean-
dominated peninsula might have been a threat to Japan, so
they were not reluctant to support American policy in that
area. The ruling party also abided by the American-led U.N.
embargo of strategic goods trade with the Chinese communists,
even though Japan was not, at that time, a member of the
United Nations.
Throughout the 1950's, as Sino-American relations remained
tense, the conservative party ruled Japan without interrup-
tion and used the U.S. -Japan alliance as the linchpin of its
foreign policy. There were voices both inside and outside
the party which called for a more independent policy direc-
tion. But the right-wing forces within the LDP, supporters




During the middle of the decade, from 1953-1958, private
contacts between Japan and China grew. The LDP-led govern-
ment supported increased business with the Chinese mainland,
although it did not officially sanction the agreements.
Peking attempted to pry Japan and the U.S. apart by trying
to inject political flavor into its trade relations with
Japan, but it was repeatedly rebuffed by the ruling party.
The conservatives followed very carefully the Sino-
American differences over Taiwan, which flared up in 1954
and 1958. In both cases, the Japanese felt relieved that a
major conflict had been avoided, the American East Asian
security commitment had been reinforced and Japanese econom-
ic interests in Taiwan remained protected.
In late 1959, the Chinese communists began to attack
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's pro-American policies by
indirect means. They entertained several anti-mainstream
LDP leaders in Peking and aided Japanese leftist attempts
to block the revision of the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security
Treaty. In the aftermath of the Peking visits, the Chinese
did succeed in reducing intra-party unity within the LDP
regarding the China question. With or without P.R.C. sup-
port, there was considerable opposition within Japan to
ratification of the revised Security Treaty. Following
Diet approval of the treaty in June i960, there was so much
public protest in the form of strikes and demonstrations
that Kishi resigned. The crisis subsided quickly with no
real change in LDP policy.
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In the early 1960's, the conservative party remained
committed to dependence upon American military and economic
ties. Although Japanese military capabilities were modestly
improving, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was still protecting Japan's
vital sea lines of communications. In 1961 about 30% of
Japan's trade was with the U.S., from whom sne received
valuable raw materials and technology.
During this period, the U.S. and the P.R.C. were still
stalemated over Taiwan, Korea, diplomatic relations and U.N.
membership. In addition, a new troublespot, Southeast Asia,
was coming into focus, where Washington was determined to
contain communist expansion and Peking feared the proximity
of the American presence. Under Hayato Ikeda the LDP took a
passive stance regarding this issue, since it had no real
interest in Peninsular Southeast Asia and wished to offend
neither the U.S. nor the P.R.C.
Meanwhile, the Chinese communists, perhaps feeling iso-
lated because of the growing split with the Soviet Union,
were making renewed overtures for expanded trade relations
with Japan. In November 1962, the semi-official Liao-
Takasaki Memorandum of Agreement was signed, calling for
two-way trade between Japan and mainland China to reach
$1 billion between 1963-1967-
In 1964, the P.R.C. conducted her first nuclear weapons
test, and in 1965, the U.S. commenced bombing raids on North
Vietnam. While these two separate events markedly increased
Sino-American hostilities toward each other, LDP policy was
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unchanged. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato expressed regret over
the Chinese test but indicated that it would not influence
Japan-P.R.C. relations. There was disagreement within the
party regarding Vietnam. Most right-wingers, who placed the
utmost importance on the U.S. alliance, supported the Ameri-
can involvement, while others, seeing no threat to Japanese
interests in Southeast Asia, opposed the U.S. policy. Over-
all, the party policy seemed to say that Southeast Asia was
a Sino-American problem and that Japan hoped to continue to
improve relations with both countries. By maintaining a
passive policy, the LDP also hoped to avoid arousing anti-
American public opinion.
Through the years, some LDP members, particularly anti-
mains t reamers
, advocated closer relations with China because
of intra-party political expediency. Others, however, had
deeper commitments to their viewpoints. Thus, in the mid-
1960' s, pro-P.R.C. and pro-Nationalist China groups formed
within the LDP. The Afro-Asian Problems Research Associa-
tion was composed of younger Dietmen and favored a more in-
dependent Japanese policy and increased contacts with main-
land China. The Asian Problems Research Association was in
favor of maintaining strong ties with the U.S. and Taiwan.
The latter group, made up of the mainstream of the party
had the decisive influence on the formation of LDP China
policy throughout the 1960's.
Politically, Japan moved closer to the U.S. and away
from the P.R.C. when she signed a normalization treaty with
86

the Republic of Korea in June 1965. The LDP recognized
Seoul as the only legitimate government in Korea and agreed
to lend hundreds of millions of dollars to South Korea for
economic development.
Two years later in late 1967, the U.S. elicited Sato's
support for its Vietnam policies by pledging to return
Okinawa "early" to Japanese sovereignty. The LDP was em-
barassed, however, when President Lyndon Johnson in March
1968, proposed a de-escalation of the war in Vietnam. This
announcement had a profound impact upon the conservatives,
some of whom, fearing a U.S. pull-out from Asia, asked for
a reappraisal of overall Japanese foreign policy. Sato
"clarified" Japan's Vietnam policy by stating that the
government would be ready to cope with future developments
but was maintaining its present policy.
LDP fears of an American withdrawal from Asia were
heightened in July 1969 when the "Nixon Doctrine" was put
forth by the American President in Guam. In his informal
statements to the press, Nixon stated that Asian nations
would be expected to increasingly handle their own conven-
tional defense problems. In the minds of the conservative
politicians, this new strategy cast doubts on the credibil-
ity of the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Against this
background, Sato met with Nixon in November 1969 and re-
ceived assurances that the U.S. would honor its security
commitments with Japan, Korea and Taiwan.
87

The March 1969 border fighting between China and the Soviet
Union made clear to the Japanese, as well as the Americans,
the depth of the Sino-Soviet differences. The LDP followed
the U.S. lead in not taking sides in the conflict and stay-
ing equidistant from the quarreling governments. Foremost
in LDP minds was improving trade relations with both commu-
nist nations while keeping politics separate from economics.
As 1971 approached, the LDP could be cautiosly optimistic
about Japan's position in East Asia. Tensions in the troub-
lespots were lessening and the Japanese economy was the
strongest in Asia. Yet the anticipated withdrawal from
Vietnam and the Nixon Doctrine caused conservatives to
speculate as to future American policy in Asia. If these
signals foretold a weakening U.S. protection of Japanese
security and economic interests, the LDP would be required
to engineer a major policy shift, with options ranging from
massive rearamament to a change in superpower alignment.
B. OPPOSITION PARTIES
As detailed in a previous chapter, over the past 25 years,
the parties in opposition have been minor foreign policy
actors. As background for Chapter Six, however, the develop-
ment of U.S. and China policies by these parties during the
1950' s and 1960's will be sketched in this section of Chapter
Five
.
1 . Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
Although the JSP had cooperated with the Liberal Par-
ty in promoting democratization in early post-war Japan, by
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independence in 1952 the left-wing majority was in chronic
opposition to the ruling conservative party. This faction's
communist tendencies and neutralist policy orientation
placed it ideologically opposite the U.S. and alongside main-
land China. The smaller right wing of the JSP was stoutly
opposed to communism and supported the alliance with the U.S.
These and other policy differences between the two factions
caused them to split into two parties in 1951.
By 1956, the socialist parties had re-united and sup-
ported the view that Peking was the only legitimate govern-
ment of China. The left and right wings of the party still
disagreed, however, on other points. The leftists wanted
Japan to abrogate its treaty with the Nationalists and to
normalize relations with Peking immediately while the right-
ists did not. At its 1957 Party Convention, the stronger
left wing elements prevailed and the JSP adopted a "one
China" policy, which stated that Formosa is a part of China
and called for normalized Sino-Japanese relations and U.N.
membership for the P.R.C.
In 1959, following a visit to Peking, JSP Secretary-
General Asanuma declared that America was a "common enemy"
of Japan and China. Thus, JSP neutralism openly shifted to
anti-Americanism. As a result of the pro-communist stance,
part of the right wing led by Suehiro Nishio deserted the
JSP to form a new party, the Democratic-Socialist Party.
Under its new policy, the JSP, with the full support of
the P.R.C, demonstrated violently against the i960 revision
of the Security Treaty. After the protests failed to prevent
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ratification of the Treaty and the LDP again won a majority
in the November I960 elections, the JSP continued to bicker
over structural reform and a change of direction in policy.
During the early to mid-1960's, the JSP remained opposed
to American imperialism, but during this time sharp differ-
ences developed between the party and Peking. The social-
ists found themselves siding with the Soviets and against
the Chinese on such matters as nuclear testing and peaceful
coexistence. To soften the protest of China's nuclear
tests, the JSP blamed the U.S. for causing the communists
to develop nuclear protection.
Still, with respect to Sino-American relations, the JSP
predominantly supported Peking's line. The 1959 defection
of Nishio's group had not depleted the party of its moderates
or right wingers. This element of the JSP continued to fol-
low a true neutralist line, while the stronger left wing
leaned to the communist powers.
In concert with portions of both the Japanese media and
public opinion, the socialists opposed the American involve-
ment in Vietnam. They tried to take advantage of the situa-
tion to make political hay and embarass the LDP. However,
the JSP was unable to ride this issue to better representa-
tion in either house of the Diet.
As the 1970 's began, the JSP was the main opposition
party to the ruling LDP. But its strength in the Diet had
declined and factional strife prevented it from presenting
a unified front. Although theoretically a neutralist party,
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the more powerful left-wing element had given JSP policy an
anti-American, communist-leaning flavor. Consequently, the
JSP supported diplomatic recognition of Peking and all its
ramifications (U.N. membership, return of Taiwan, etc.).
2
.
Japan Communist Party (JCP )
When the American occupation ended in 1952, the JCP
was in shambles. Factional disputes had wracked the party's
leadership and violent tactics had led to government repres-
sion and voter alienation. JCP alignment at the time was
totally pro-Peking and anti-American.
The communists spent the 1950 T s rebuilding. In order to
strengthen political support, the JCP abandoned the thesis
of violent revolution, advocating a non-violent transition
into an independent (out of the U.S. camp), peaceful and
democratic government. In any showdown between the U.S.
and the P.R.C. the sympathies of the JCP would clearly have
been with the P.R.C. The JCP joined a Chinese-backed
"united front" with the JSP and other progressives in pro-
testing against the I960 U.S. -Japan Security Treaty revision
While the JCP's position vis-a-vis the U.S. and the
P.R.C. was never in question, the early 1960's saw the JCP
in an embarrassing position with respect to the emerging
Sino-Soviet conflict. The Japanese communists tended to
side with the Chinese in the dispute, although they asserted
their position of autonomy and independence.
As U.S. involvement in Vietnam progressed in the
latter part of the decade, the JCP called for a unified
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communist opposition to American imperialism. In light of
its cleavage with the Soviet Union, the P.R.C. rebuffed this
plan. This disagreement, together with the JCP's rejection
of the CCP's theory of violent revolution for Japan, helped
to create a split between the two parties. In 1967, the
Japanese communists formally broke ties with their Chinese
counterparts and called for the overthrow of the CCP. At
this point, the JCP re-established relations with the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), while still pledg-
ing complete independence.
As the 1960's ended, the JCP policy toward the U.S.
remained unchanged. The party opposed U.S. intervention in
Asia, and, despite its sour relations with the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP), supported international diplomatic recog-
nition of Peking and U.N. membership.
3 . Komeito (Clean Government Party )
A newcomer to Japanese politics, the Komeito first
gained national political stature in 1967 when it elected
25 members to the House of Representatives. According to
one observer, "The party's foreign policy program appears
to have evolved on an ad hoc basis as it has been pressed
to take stands on important questions being debated in the
Diet and media. In the absence of any experience in deal-
ing with diplomatic problems, it is not surprising that the
party's response has often seemed to be a product of a com-
bination of popular nationalism, lofty but inchoate and
vague political principles, and a readiness to cater to
48
what was believed to be the wishes of the voters."
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As the 1970's began, the Komeito supported a neu-
tralist foreign policy position. Its China policy was op-
posed to the LDP's but more moderate than the other parties
in opposition. The party recognized Peking as the legiti-
mate government of China and supported its admission to the
United Nations but stopped short of abandoning Taiwan, sim-
ply calling it an "internal problem."
With respect to the U.S., the Clean Government Party urged
a lessening of tension in Asia by the phasing out of the
U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Once the U.S. was out
of Japan, the party reasoned, the door would be opened for
better Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan would be able to
pursue a true neutralist policy.
4
. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP )
Like the Komeito, the DSP, which was formed when the
JSP split in 1959, advocates a neutral Japan. The democrat-
ic socialists, however, hold that Japan needs a strong de-
fensive capability to ensure her national security.
Consistent with its advocacy of a rearmed indepen-
dent Japan, throughout the 1960's the DSP opposed the LDP's
close association with the U.S. The party felt that Japan
should not become entangled in the Cold War and that a strong
Japan would not need the military alliance with the U.S.
The DSP maintained a "one China, one Taiwan" policy.
This approach called for diplomatic recognition and U.N.
membership for Peking, while at the same time, Taiwan would
be allowed to hold its U.N. seat until the inhabitants of
the island decided their own future. The democratic
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socialists urged better economic and cultural relations with
China, but, unlike the other socialist party, the DSP's in-
tense ant i- communist feelings prevented it from developing
ties with the CCP.
As 1971 loomed, the China policy of the DSP, although
opposed by both Peking and Taipei, probably reflected the
attitudes of most voters and Dietmen in Japan. The LDP,
however, could not openly support this stance since it was
being constrained by its relationship with the U.S.
To sum up this section, at the beginning of the 1970's
every opposition party was advocating diplomatic recognition
of Peking, U.N. membership for the communist government, and
closer Sino-Japanese cultural and economic relations. Backed
by public opinion (to be studied in detail later), these
parties brought pressure to bear on the LDP but could do no
more than embarrass the government.
With somewhat less enthusiasm, the parties in oppo-
sition all called for an end to close Japanese dependency
on the U.S. In this area, they had little political leverage
since more Japanese than not felt that the Security Treaty
was in the interests of Japan.
Because the minority parties could not unite to form
an effective opposition, they remained little more than a
thorn in the side of the LDP. As we shall see, the Japanese
central bureaucracy played a much more important role in




Despite the fact that the ruling party in Japan is the
controlling force behind governmental policy decisions,
the central bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, exercises considerable influence in foreign af-
fairs. This section of Chapter Five will pinpoint the pre-
1971 attitudes of these two important foreign policy actors
toward the U.S. and China.
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
From the start it should be pointed out that the
Foreign Office contains deeply-rooted political divisions
that prevent it from articulating a single line of govern-
mental policy. MFA ' s United Nations and American Affairs
Bureaus consistently and publicly supported pro-Taipei, pro-
American positions until the eve of normalization with Pe-
king. In private, they continue to espouse this line.
Conversely, the ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau generally
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supported initiatives to normalize relations with Peking.
A discussion of the evolution of predominant MFA
views of Sino-American relations from 1952-1971 would es-
sentially be a repetition of the LDP section of this chapter.
Various divisions of the Foreign Office opposed overall
governmental policy at different times. However, the pre-
vailing ministry philosophy during the 1950 's and 1960's
was that continued military and economic cooperation with




This attitude was entirely consisten with that of the
other two legs of the conservative triad, the LDP and busi-
ness, and was established during the Yoshida government,
when the Prime Minister dominated the conservative scene,
recruited many of his former foreign ministry colleagues
into his party, and reshaped the ministry staff in line with
SIhis own policy disposition. Not surprisingly, the large
enterprises of Keidanren, which are most heavily involved
in economic cooperation with advanced industrial countries,
52have acquired a similar policy disposition.
What operated to suppress the bureaucrats' desire
for a settlement with China was a reluctance to sacrifice
Japan's interests in Tiawan and the fear that a misstep
might in some way antagonize the U.S. and disturb the or-
derly exchange of capital, goods, people and information
upon which the prosperity of Japan depended. Any weakening
of mutual trust and friendship between the U.S. and Japan
might also have disastrous political and military conse-
quences. The extreme caution induced by this fear was
particularly evident in MFA.^
This basic policy of close association with the
U.S., which was so deeply engrained in the Foreign Ministry,
was not similarly adhered to by all other governmental
bureaucracies. Indeed, the influential MITI was often
staunchly opposed to the Foreign Office viewpoint.
2. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
During the post-war years, the two ministries which
most frequently came into conflict over China policy were
MFA and MITI. 96

To the "mainstream" of Japanese business, China trade
was only one strand in a world-wide network— and not very
important at that. MITI has tended to act not as a spokes-
man for the interests of large firms, but for the interests
of the trading companies, whose activities it superintends.
Many of these trading companies, especially the weaker or
smaller ones, did not have the strategic perspective of the
mainstream and thus were extremely eager to expand trade as
rapidly as possible, seizing every opportunity to move into
the China market
.
As far back as 1952 MITI clashed with the Foreign
Office over China policy. When Yoshida's Foreign Minister,
Okazaki Kazuo, refused to relax the special embargo on trade
with the P.R.C. immediately after Japan gained independence,
55MITI openly took exception. ^ Contributing to MITI's for-
ward-looking China policy was the fact that , during the
1950's, cabinet appointments to the post of Minister of
International Trade and Industry went to open sympathizers
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of the Peking government.
In the 1960's, MITI collaborated with private busi-
ness to give semi-official qualities to the L-T Trade Memo-
randum. MITI allowed two officials to participate in the
negotiations in Peking, and later appointed minor ministry
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officials to the permanent mission in the Chinese capital.-"
Watanabe Yaeji, Director of MITI's Trade Promotion
Bureau, stated in 1965, "The vacillating attitude of the
Government toward trade with Communist China is most de-
plorable. Although the Government says that is will push
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forward trade with Communist China with a forward-looking
attitude, not a single Government official has ever been
dispatched to Communist China so far. If an opportunity
comes, I will visit Communist China myself. "^
Thus, MITT's dominant, if only, theme during the
period being studied was expansion of trade with all coun-
tries, including China, in response to the ministry's some-
what narrow-based constituency.
In concluding this section on MPA and MIT I, it must
be understood that the long-standing differences between
the orientation of these two ministries was never extended
to the political-strategic question of an independent Japa-
nese security posture. The Foreign Office had no objection
to expanded Sino-Japanese trade but did not want this to
occur at the expense of a security arrangement predicated
on a common adversary relationship with Peking. MITI had
no objection to the existence of the American security alli-
ance but did not want the common adversary relationship to
59be intensified so as to reduce Sino-Japanese trade.
D. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The bureaucracy's only peer as a force capable of in-
fluencing the LDP is the Japanese economic community. In
general, the mutual values and goals of business and the
ruling party guide them down the same path. However, in
some cases, such as Japan-China relations in the early
1970' s, the immense power of the economic organizations
drives the government to follow rather than lead.
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Even before the peace treaty with the U.S. went into
effect in March 1952, Keidanren, the "front office of the
business community," took the stand that economic cooperation
with the U.S. was an absolute necessity and strongly urged
the government to take steps to accelerate economic cooper-
ation. As seen earlier, the Yoshida government concurred
with this view and built its entire foreign policy around
the framework of the U.S.- Japan alliance.
That policy did not, however, prevent the development of
trade between Japan and the P.R.C. during the 1950's and
1960 T s. The small-scale trade that commenced between Japan
and China shortly after the founding of the Peking govern-
ment declined drastically with the Korean War and with the
enforcement of the trade embargo by the U.S. and the Western
allies. But beginning in 1952, a series of nongovernmental
trade agreements between the P.R.C. and Japan resulted in
growing commercial intercourse. Trade relations were termi-
nated, however, in May 1958 following the Nagasaki flag
incident
.
In I960, the two countries reopened trade contacts when
China adopted the "three principles of trade," outling the
forms of trade which could develop between Japan and China.
Since the new Ikeda government followed the previously-
established policy of not officially sanctioning trade
agreements, China solicited the assistance of the China-
Japan Trade Promotion League and the Japan International
Trade Promotion Association to select the private firms
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(or "friendly firms") to enter into contact with the main-
land Chinese .
The position of the mainstream of the business community
toward the communist Chinese remained one of detachment.
These leaders felt that trade with the continent should be
encouraged but only as long as relations with the U.S. were
not disturbed. If there were indications that modifications
in policy might upset U.S. -Japan relations, the mainstream
supported the government in its refusal to make such modifi-
cations .
Many small and medium-sized companies T interests diverged
from those of the mainstream. In particular, weaker firms,
striving for solvency on a month-to-month basis, cared very
little about the strategic considerations which concerned
the more secure industrial giants. These small and weak
companies flocked to the Japan-China associations, eager to
expand their trade. These "friendly firms," numbering about
300, most of which had fewer than ten employees, became the
main trade route between Japan and China.
In 1962 the L-T Trade Memorandum was signed allowing
for long-term contracts for the export of industrial plants
to China. When Sato became Prime Minister in November
1964, his pro-Taiwan attitude strained Sino-Japanese af-
fairs. Nonetheless, despite this political obstruction,
economic relations expanded rapidly in the mid to late




In April 1970, Chou En-lai, frustrated that China's
attempts to use trade contacts for political purposes had
not succeeded, enunciated new criteria for trade with Japa-
nese firms. Under what became known as Chou En-lai ' 3 "four
conditions," companies that assisted Taiwan or South Korea
through trade or investment, or assisted the war in Indo-
china, were to be excluded from the China market.
This announcement caused considerable consternation with-
in the mainstream of the Japanese business community, most of
which had business connections with Peking, Taipei and
Seoul. Chemical Fertilizer and Steel, the two major indus-
trial interests that had become heavily invovled in the
China market, in general accepted these new conditions.
Four of the nine major trading companies, all based in the
Kansai area and having minor shares in the Taiwan and South
Korean market, expressed their intention of supporting the
concessions
.
The Japanese business community, as a whole, attempted
not to take sides for or against the P.R.C., adopting a
wait-and-see policy. None of the economic organizations
issued a formal statement, although some leaders protested
China's intervention in Japanese domestic matters.
In sum, the attitudes of the zaikai, the "captain" of
the Japanese economy, toward the U.S. and China was largely
unchanged from the early 1950 's to 1970. While other ele-
ments of Japanese business urged normalization and U.N.
membership on behalf of the Peking government, the mainstream
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policy remained in consonance with the other two-thirds of
the conservative leadership.
E. PUBLIC OPINION
The final section of this chapter will describe the at-
titudes of the Japanese public toward the U.S. and China
during the two decades following independence.
In the 1950' s, the science of public polling was rela-
tively unsophisticated in Japan, however, there is some
evidence upon which to judge the opinions of the people.
A 195^ poll of business executives, government offi-
cials, scholars, and labor union leaders found that a
majority in every category endorsed diplomatic relations
with Peking (Table 1).
TABLE 1
"As to the opening of diplomatic relations with Communist
China, is it desirable or not?"




62% 76% 90% 9^%
111 8% — 2%
27$ 16% 10% k%
100% 100$ 100$ 100$
Source: Lloyd A. Free, "The Dynamics of Influence in
Today's Japan," Princeton, N.J.: The Research
Council, Inc. (195*0; cited by Nathan N. White,
"An Analysis of Japan's China Policy under the
Liberal Democratic Party, 1955-1970" Ph.D. Dis-




A few years later, another poll found that a plurality of
Tokyo voters favored recognition for both Taipei and Peking
but that more people preferred to recognize only mainland
China than Taiwan (Table 2).
TABLE 2
"What do you think about the problem of recognition of
Red China?"
The status quo should be maintained. (We




Both Nationalist China and Red China
should be recognized. 40.2?
Red China should be recognized, and we
should withdraw recognition from
Nationalist China. 22.5?
A China to be created after unification
of Nationalist and Communist China
should be recognized. 1.3?
Don't know; no answer 19 . 1?
98.9?
Source: Tokyo Shimbun , January 8, 1957; cited by White,
"Japan's China Policy," p. 218.
However, in a nationwide poll conducted in late 195*1,
the respondents, who were allowed to pick more than one
country, showed a clear preference for the U.S. over the
P.R.C. 33.3? said they like the U.S. and 11.9? said they
liked communist China, while 10.6? disliked the U.S. and
21.3? disliked communist China.
With respect to the Peking U.N. membership issue, the
uncertainty of the Japanese people over the matter of
Taiwan was apparent in 1957, as seen by Douglas Mendel's








"Should Japan support Communist China's bid for a U.N,
seat, oppose it, or abstain from voting?"
Osaka Izumo
Support seating of Peking




Source: Douglas H. Mendel, The Japanese People and
Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1961), p. 238.
The above tables show that during the 1950 's there was
considerable sentiment among the Japanese people for closer
relations with mainland China. Nonetheless, a nationwide
survey in 1959 showed that 53% favored cooperation with the
American bloc, while only 1% favored cooperation with the
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Communist bloc.
Throughout the 1960's the P.R.C. together with the
Soviet Union was the major object of Japanese fear and
animosity. Between 1966 and 1968 the Japanese disliked
China even more than Russia, but by the early 1970 's Japa-
nese feelings toward China began to warm considerably.
(See Chart 1, Appendix A).
Table 4 shows that during this time period the majority
of Japanese either favored a two-China policy, if it could





Japanese Opinions on China
(by percentage of responses)























Sources: Jiji Tsushinsha, Feb. 1964, Nenkan, 1964,
p. 220; and Kyodo Press (Tsushinsha), June
1967, Nenkan, 1968, p. 419; as cited by
Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion
and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1974," in Robert
A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of
Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), p. 128.
Additionally, a 1970 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that a
plurality of respondents blamed poor Sino-American relations
for Japan's China problem (Table 5).
TABLE 5
"What do you think is the biggest cause which is obstruc-
ting friendly relations between Japan and China?"
Relations between Ameerica and. China
The Sato Cabinet's diplomatic posture
The presence of the Nationalist Government on
Taiwan
China's posture toward other nations
Others







Source: Yomiuri Shimbun , May 31, 1970; cited by White,
"Japan's China Policy," p. 226.
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Up until 1965, as illustrated by Chart 2, the Japanese pub-
lic has had a generally favorable impression of the U.S.
The sharp fall in American popularity in 1965 was probably
caused by the beginning of heightened U.S. intervention in
the Vietnam war. The U.S. regained some popularity after
the initial interest over Vietnam died down, but it slipped
again during 1967-1968. The gradual deterioration of the
American image in Japan during these years was most likely
related to the Japanese fear of becoming involved in the
U.S. military actions in Southeast Asia. 65
A series of surveys conducted twice a year since I960
in Tokyo found that opinions toward the Security Treaty
reversed over a nine-year span (Table 6). The Mainichi
Shimbun questioned Japanese political party members in 1968
concerning their attitudes toward the Security Treaty and
found some support for the alliance in all parties (Table 7)
TABLE 6
Japanese Attitudes toward the Mutual
Security Treaty with the U.S.








Pro Con Other Know
20 46 6 29
33 37 2 28
28 29 5 38
39 26 11 24
40 22 8 30
36 28 7 29
Source: Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Tokyo teiki chosa no kekka
,





Breakdown by Party Affiliation of Japanese Opinion
Regarding the Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S.
(by percentage of responses)
Noncom- Other/
Favorable Unfavorable mittal No answer
Total 30 20 43 7
By party support
Liberal Dem. 48 6









Source: Mainichi Shimbun , July 1, 1968; cited by Watanabe,
"Japanese Public Opinion," p. 140.
Aside from the security relationship, the Japanese peo-
ple believed in 1969 that there existed a connection between
their economic well-being and a close association with the
U.S. (Table 8).
TABLE 8
"There is ' the opinion that 'it was because the American
forces have defended Japan that Japan was able to develop
economically after the end of the War.' Are you in favor
of this opinion or opposed to it?"
In favor of it 55%




Source: Asahi Shimbun , January 5, 1969; cited by White
"Japan's China Policy," p. 278.
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Once may generalize from the above information that dur-
ing the 1950' s and 1960's the Japanese were not happy about
their state of relations with Peking, they would like to have
had normalized relations with both Taiwan and the P.R.C.,
they believed communist China deserved a seat in the United
Nations, and they supported the close relationship with the
U.S. In other words, the decision-makers were not being
supported in their policy to exclude Peking, but they also
were not being given a clear direction by the people. This
put the government in the difficult position of being criti-
cized for not adopting policies which the realities of the
international situation made impractical to put into effect--
namely, the U.S. alliance prevented normalization with China
and neither Taiwan nor the P.R.C. would accept a "two-Chinas"
solution.
One of the more striking features of this analysis of
Japanese interest groups is the absence of the military or
the armed forces as an influential policy-making or opinion-
expressing group. This absence may well be due to the un-
fortunate heritage of the militarists' role in World War II
and the defeat of Japan. The mission of the Self Defense
Force in the early years of Japan's rebirth seemed to be
entirely professional—that is, providing for the defense
of Japan without public expression of either individual or
group views on matters of policy. As the political aspects
of Japan's security problems were to grow in the years
ahead, the new emergence of the Self Defense Force and
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politicians' interests in the status of Japan's security
was to be anticipated.
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VI. INTEREST GROUP POLICIES REGARDING
U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS: THE CURRENT
ATTITUDES
The last chapter discussed the development of interest
group policies regarding U.S.-P.R.C. relations up to the
beginning of the 1970' s. Taking this background into account,
Chapter Six will examine the attitudes of these interest
groups with respect to current Sino-American affairs. At-
tention will be focused on the important issues of normal-
ization of relations, trade and resources, ideological
conflict and the strategic balance.
A. LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY
The July 19 71 announcement by President Nixon that he
planned to visit Peking was a veritable shock to the LDP.
The U.S. apparently had not consulted with the Japanese
leadership concerning this breakthrough in relations. The
impact of the U.S.-P.R.C. development shook the conserva-
tive party to its foundations. The LDP elders had bucked
a great deal of external and internal opposition in sup-
porting the U.S. policy of isolating China. By "jumping
over the head" of Japan, the U.S. had humiliated the ruling
party
.
Determined not to be left behind by the U.S., the LDP
moved quickly to normalize relations between Tokyo and
Peking. Despite reluctance on the part of pro-Taiwan
members of the party, business pressure could not be
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resisted and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka established diplo-
matic relations with the P.R.C. in September 1972. The
"Japanese solution" to the China problem entailed severence
of formal ties with the Nationalist government on Taiwan in
name only. In fact, relations between Japan and Taiwan con-
tinued almost as before. Given the 1952-1972 background of
LDP policy, what are the current attitudes of the party
towards U.S. -P.R.C. relations?
Through LDP eyes, normalization of relations between
Washington and Peking is a most critical matter. The estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations is by itself not as impor-
tant as the manner in which it is done.
As noted in an earlier chapter, U.S. policies in Asia
during the past decade have raised some doubts in Japanese
minds as to the strength of the American commitment to help
defend Japan's national interests. The act of normalizing
relations with China probably would not substantially erode
Japanese confidence in the U.S. any further. However, if
the U.S. were to agree to the communist conditions that call
for the abrogation of the security treaty and removal of
American troops from Taiwan, the powerful right wing of the
LDP would be highly distressed. This group would, no doubt,
interpret such a move as withdrawal of protection of Japa-
nese economic interests on the island and a further decline
in American security credibility throughout Asia.
Establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington
and Peking would almost surely be followed by a step-up of
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economic intercourse. Such an eventuality would result in
increased business competition between the U.S. and Japan
for the China market. Prom that angle, normalization must
be treated with caution by the business-supported LDP.
Although on record as favoring improved Sino-American
relations, it follows, then, that the conservative party
benefits most from a continuation of the status quo. While
a decrease in tension between the U.S. and China suits
Japan, if the rapprochement is at Tokyo's expense, the LDP
will be forced to rethink its overseas policy line. Armed
neutrality and alignment with Moscow are two extreme options
which are possible but for a number of reasons would be dif-
ficult and less desirable than the American alliance.
With respect to the issue of Sino-American trade and
resources, the views of the LDP closely parallel those of
the Japanese business community. Here, cooler U.S.-P.R.C.
relations probably mean U.S. pressure on Japan to cut back
economic ties with China, while warmer relations translate
into increased U.S. -Japan competition for the China market.
As the most industrialized state in East Asia, Japan is
in an advantageous economic situation. She exports great
quantities of medium-technology equipment to the developing
nations of Asia, consistently underpricing outside competi-
tion. Japanese businessmen would like to help China to
industrialize without U.S. competition. In the long run,
however, this policy may backfire if China reaches a posi-




On the other hand, if the U.S. succeeded in markedly
"opening up" China, Japanese business might stand to gain.
However, the current Chinese leadership seems dedicated to
self-reliance and undisposed to allowing foreign invest-
ments in her economy.
Presently, the economies of Japan and China complement
each other. Japan needs the raw materials that China seems
to have in abundant supply, and China can use Japanese tech-
nology in modernizing her industry. Further, by importing
Chinese raw materials, Japan can be more diversified in her
resource dependence.
As with the issue of normalization, the Japanese would
seem to be better off economically by maintaining the cur-
rent situation although there is no way to be sure that
normalization would result in expanded trade. Japanese
businessmen, thus the LDP, probably have more to lose than
gain from improved U.S.-P.R.C. economic relations.
A third issue facing the U.S. and China is the ideolog-
ical conflict. The U.S., with an open society, encourages
international cooperation, while the Chinese communists
theoretically urge the overthrow of the capitalist system.
The Chinese, however, participate in the international opera-
tions of the capitalist system on terms of monopoly dealing which
they can accept. The LDP approaches the matter with prag-
matism. In dealing with foreign countries, the conserva-
tives try to separate politics from economics by not
discriminating between socialist and capitalist states.
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Thus an accommodation of the ideological conflict separating
the U.S. and the P.R.C. would not by itself concern the LDP.
In fact, the party probably would view such a development
as politically stablizing for East Asia.
The strategic balance is the last of the current issues
to be examined. There can be no question that the LDP oppo-
ses the possession of nuclear weapons by China. Under the
present arrangement with the U.S., Japan is protected by
the American nuclear deterrent. Most conservatives still
feel that the treaty is credible, but there is also a feel-
ing within the party that in the future careful attention
must be paid to the possible shifts in American attitudes.
If the Japanese were to believe that the U.S. protective
umbrella were to be withdrawn, then Japan would have to re-
assess the power structure in East Asia and embark on a
new policy direction.
If, at that point, the P.R.C. had a nuclear force and was
not a close ally, Japan's interests would clearly be threat-
ened. For that matter, it would be counter to Japan's long-
term interests to have any neighbor nuclear capable. For
these reasons, the LDP will support efforts to limit China's
nuclear stockpile.
A discussion of LDP views on Sino-American relations
would not be complete without a discussion of the role of
the Soviet Union in the Asian four-power system. Since
normalization with China in 1972, Japan's policy has been
to keep abreast of U.S. -China developments while not
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drastically altering its ties with the Soviet Union. The
most serious restraint on Tokyo's signing of a treaty of
friendship and cooperation with Peking is the "anti-hegemony"
clause, transparently aimed at Moscow, insisted upon by the
Chinese. While the ruling party wants to continue the warm-
ing trend with the P.R.C., it is also concerned with improv-
ing relations with the Soviet Union.
In sum, the LDP still sees Japan's best interests being
met by a continuation of the close alliance with the U.S.
However, if Sino-American relations grow substantially
warmer Japan may perceive her security and economic posi-
tion in Asia as threatened.
B. OPPOSITION PARTIES
After Sino-Japanese relations were normalized in 1972,
China was no longer a "hot" domestic issue in Japan. Conse-
quently, it was difficult to pinpoint all the views of the
opposition parties toward the U.S. and the P.R.C. For the
most part, attitudes toward current issues could be inferred
from general party policy. It should be emphasized, however,
that since 1952 opposition party foreign policy stances have
not significantly affected government policy.
1. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
The "Nixon shock" of 1971 and the subsequent estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China
took much of the wind out of the JSP's sails. For nearly
twenty years the socialists had been claiming to be the
best contact between the two countries, while advocating
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the popular position of closer Sino-Japanese relations.
Following the 1972 recognition of Peking, the JSP had one
less issue with which to embarrass the ruling LDP.
Turning to current issues, the JSP has no large
stake in the matter of diplomatic relations between Peking
and Washington. If China were recognized by the U.S. and
Taiwan abandoned, the socialists' long-held goal would be
realized—that is, China whole again and Peking further le-
gitimized. Further, with the U.S. out of Taiwan, another
blow would have been struck against American imperialism.
When speaking of the trade and resources issue, one
must remember that the JSP is the "political arm" of Sohyo,
the largest federation of unions in Japan. Therefore, the
socialists can be expected to support any economic policy
which will benefit the Japanese worker. This probably means
that, for the reasons stated in the previous section, the
best interests of both the LDP and the JSP are met by a
continuation of the status quo in economic relations between
the U.S. and China.
With respect to ideology, JSP official policy is to
maintain an unarmed neutralist stance in international af-
fairs. However, the left and right wings of the party
strongly disagree on this matter. The right wing believes
that Japan can only remain neutral by arming herself. The
left group, backed by Sohyo and the stronger of the two
elements, refuses to consider rearmament and has moved the




The recent warming trend in Sino-American relations
has caused some confusion for the socialists. They have con-
sistently coupled with the Chinese communists to decry Amer-
ican imperialism in Asia. Now that Peking has toned down its
criticism of the U.S., the JSP must follow suit or it will
find itself in disagreement with its old partner, which may
cause the party to lose some credibility. However, to sup-
port this policy shift the same U.S. actions (Vietnam,
Korean troop withdrawal) which worry the LDP can be cited by
the JSP as signs of declining U.S. influence in Asia. None-
theless, it appears that if the U.S. and the P.R.C. were to
set aside their ideological differences, it would embarrass
the JSP.
The issue of the strategic balance also places the
JSP in a quandary. The party cannot condone P.R.C. develop-
ment of a nuclear capability because it has based part of
its support upon the principle of disarmament; yet neither
does it want to alienate the CCP. Therefore, the socialists
cling to the position that abrogation of the U.S. -Japan
Mutual Security Treaty and American military withdrawal
from Asia will enable the Chinese to lay down their arms.
In this manner, the JSP neatly blames the U.S. for China's
nuclear force.
As one considers the JSP's foreign policy positions
and specifically its perspectives of Sino-American relations,
it must be remembered that the socialists have been an oppo-
sition party for thirty years and appear to have little hope
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of coming to power in the near future. Some observers feel
that the party has givne up hope of ruling Japan and, as a
permanent opponent of the LDP, may support unrealistic poli-
cies just for the purpose of opposing the ruling conservatives
It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that, for somewhat
different reasons, both the LDP and the JSP do not seem to
benefit from much-improved Sino-American relations. If this
development takes place, the conservatives must question
Japan's new role in Asia, while the socialists would find
itself opposing a China friendly with la bete noire , imperi-
alist America.
2 . Komeito (Clean Government Party)
Like the other political parties, the Komeito was
surprised by the rapid chain of events leading to the 1972
normalization of relations between Tokyo and Peking.
Current Komeito attitudes toward Sino-American re-
lations are not entirely clear. It is known that the party
supports recognition of Peking and withdrawal of American
protection of Taiwan. Beyond this active issue, however, the
Komeito speaks vaguely of "one-worldism" and stability in
Asia.
Although the Clean Government Party is not a strong
voice in Japanese politics, in the near future it could
possibly be invited to form a coalition government with a
weakening LDP. If this were to happen, the Komeito might
be induced, through enticements and concessions, to go along
with conservative foreign policy philosophy.
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3. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)
The 1972 "Japanese solution" to the China problem
engineered by the ruling LDP closely matched the DSP view-
point. In fact, the attitudes of the democratic socialists
toward Sino-American relations are probably closer to the
conservatives' than any opposition party (with the possible
exception of the New Liberal Club). It is significant that
the DSP is increasingly identified with the rise of "new
nationalism" in Japan.
Like the LDP, it can be inferred that the anti-com-
munist DSP sees closer economic and political relations be-
tween the U.S. and China as detrimental to Japan's interests.
This rapprochement would enhance China's position in Asia.
However, such an eventuality does strengthen the party's
neutralist argument by demonstrating that Japan would be
much more secure by providing for her own defense.
Due to its limited representation in the Diet (29
in the Lower House, 10 in the Upper Hose), the DSP alone is
not an influential foreign policy actor. Yet because the
party is closer to the LDP than the JSP on most issues,
along with the Komeito it is a likely candidate should the
LDP require a coalition partner.
4. Japan Communist Party (JCP)
The Japanese communists were shocked by the 1971
Nixon announcement as much as the LDP was. In fact, the
JCP was distressed that Peking "could shake hands with the
number one enemy, American imperialism, while remaining
hostile to the JCP and the Soviet Union."
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Despite its dispute with the Chinese Communist Party
beginning in 1966, the JCP has continued to support the legit-
imization of the Peking government. However, the party can-
not abide by any further warming of relations between the
U.S. and China. While closer Sino-American economic rela-
tions for temporary purposes might be understandable, an
ideological accommodation on the part of the Chinese runs
counter to the worldwide communist ideal. Likewise, the JCP
supported Peking's nuclear force development but not for the
possibility of seeing it paired with the U.S. against the
Soviet Union.
The JCP defines its role as a force combatting com-
munism's primary enemy in the world today—American imperi-
alism. The party claims to be neutral in the Sino-Soviet
conflict and would patch up its differences with Peking if
the CCP would abandon its anti-JCP attitude. In the mean-
time, the JCP must view a closer U.S.-P.R.C. association
as counter to the goals of worldwide communism.
In sum, then, current information indicates that the
opposition parties feel that the warming trend in Sino-
American relations may not be in the long-term interests of
the parties or Japan. For the JSP and, to a lesser extent
the JCP, this development represents friendship between an
old friend (P.R.C.) and the erstwhile common enemy (U.S.).




Despite this general consensus, the minority parties
in Japan today are not significant foreign policy actors.
Because they cannot present a unified front, the parties
have little chance of unseating the conservative government
and are largely ineffective in the Diet. This fact is evi-
dent when one considers that the LDP reversed its stand on
China not because of opposition pressure, but due to exter-
nal factors
.
Even though the LDP Diet majority is slim, the Japa-
nese political power equation has not changed much over the
past 25 years. Presently, it is important to understand the
opposition parties' perspectives on Sino-American relations
only when looking to the possibility of one or more of these
groups forming a coalition government with the LDP. In such
a case, an LDP partner, being in an inferior position, would
likely have to alter its present policies. The minority
viewpoints expressed in this section would gain significance
if, in the unlikely event, the parties united in opposition
to the LDP or gained broad popular support for their policies
C. CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Despite the blow delivered by President Nixon in
1971, deeply-rooted pro-American, pro-Taiwan feelings con-
tinue to dominate the powerful United Nations and American
Affairs Bureaus of the Foreign Ministry. At the same time,
subsequent to Japan's normalization with the P.R.C. in 1972,
the pro-Peking Asian Affairs Bureau gained considerable
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influence. Nonetheless, one researcher conducted a series
of interviews and found that officials within the Minister's
Secretariat and the Economic Affairs and Public Information
and the Cultural Affairs Bureaus stated time and again that
their commitment remained with a close relationship with the
U.S. 69
It seems safe to say, then, that MFA perspectives
toward Sino-American policy issues closely parallel those
of the ruling LDP. In fact, since the ministry has no con-
stituency and is not directly responsive to public opinion,
the bureaucrats probably tend to be more conservative than
the politicians. In any event, ministry officials normally
will not go on public record as being opposed to LDP-inspired
governmental policy.
In the interviews with Foreign Ministry bureaucrats
mentioned above, the researcher found indications of impa-
tience and defiance, with heavy nationalistic overtones,
among younger officials. His impression was that these
feelings will effect the general orientation of Japanese
foreign policy, and that these "Young Turks" may be begin-
ning to fight against post-war pacifism and "economic diplo-
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macy" in the name of an independent foreign policy.
But, at the present time, traditionalist views pre-
vail within the Foreign Office, meaning that this branch of
the executive bureaucracy will be extremely wary of a closer
U.S.-P.R.C. relationship which excludes Japan. If a Sino-
American rapprochement were to include Japan, she would





Ministry of International Trade and Industry ( MITI)
The improvement in Sino-American relations in 1971-
1972 was a pleasant surprise for MITI. All along, the minis-
try had been urging official contacts between Japan and China
to further economic relations. MFA and the mainstream of
the LDP rejected this measure as a potential irritant to
governmental policies toward the U.S. and the Republic of
China. President Nixon took away part of this reasoning
by announcing his trip to Peking, opening the way for in-
creased trade between Japan and China. Even before rela-
tions were normalized between Tokyo and Peking, all of the
major trading companies had entered the China market
.
MITI has a very parochial view of Sino-American re-
lations. Of the four major issues being discussed in this
chapter, only diplomatic recognition and trade and resources
are of primary concern to the ministry.
When Japan normalized relations with the P.R.C. in
1972, it was able to carry on its political and eoconomic
interactions with Taiwan almost unabated. This was made
possible by the American security guarantee, which protected
Japan's interests on the island. Since abrogation of the
treaty with Taiwan and withdrawal of U.S. forces are Peking's
steadfast conditions for normalization, MITI opposes this
development in U.S. -China relations. Once American protec-
tion is removed from Taiwan, the booming Japan-Taiwan trade
must surely suffer and Japanese investments there will be
in jeopardy. Thus, while other members of the government
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might regard Sino-American normalization as a signal of a
waning U.S. security commitment to Japan, MITI would regard
it as a business loss.
The U.S. and the P.R.C. may move to expand economic
ties with or without diplomatic relations. Again, MITI would
be apprehensive of this development. Although trade between
Japan and mainland China is hardly "booming," the Japanese
are in the advantageous position of being a primary provider
of advanced technology to the developing Chinese economy.
The U.S. would be in a position to challenge the Japanese
in China if relations improved— a condition which is not in
the best interests of MITI's constituency.
Therefore, MITI, unlike MFA, appears to have nothing
to gain from immediate improving Sino-American relations.
While the Foreign Office realizes that warming relations
may enhance Asian stability and thus the nation's strategic
security, MITI looks at the problem on a small economic
scale and consequently feels a much greater degree of appre-
hension .
D. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Following the 1971 Nixon announcement, the Japanese
business community moved quickly. Companies that previous-
ly had had no large amount of business on the mainland be-
gan to move to win future access. Yet, New Japan Steel
board chairman Shigeo Nagano stated, "It is true that this
has made it much easier for Japanese economic circles to
move with an eye to China. It is delightful to have new
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friends. At the same time, however, we must not forsake
our old friends."'
By August 1971 the heads of the Japan Committee for
Economic Development (JCED) and the Japan Chamber of Com-
merce (JCC)
,
two of the four most powerful economic organi-
zations in Japan, had taken positive stances toward Peking,
and the mainstream of the business community gravitated
rapidly toward the P.R.C. Prime Minister Sato was said to
have been infuriated by the behavior of these business
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leaders. The business community seemed to realize before
the government that eventual Japanese recognition of the
P.R.C. was a foregone conclusion.
Turning to present-day issues, there is probably agree-
ment among the layers of Japanese business concerning nor-
malization of relations between the U.S. and China—but for
different reasons. It seems likely that the business main-
stream would welcome further relaxation of tension between
Washington and Peking as conducive to Asian political and
economic stability. On the other hand, being attuned to
strategic perspectives, this element of Japanese business
would also share the misgivings of the LDP and MFA concern-
ing the perceived American pull-back from Asia and its im-
plications for Japan. In the minds of these men, although
they might welcome the normalization of relations between
the U.S. and the P.R.C, they are fearful that this might
imply the reduction of U.S. forces in Asia and the abandon-
ment of the American security obligation to Taiwan. There-
fore, their enthusiasm for the former is dampened by their
fear of the latter.
-^5

The lower echelons of the business community would oppose
U.S. normalization with Peking because of the concomitant
loss of trade with Taiwan. Presently, these companies enjoy
the best of two worlds since they are free to trade with
both China and Taiwan.
Closely related to normalization is the issue of trade
and resources. The Japanese business establishment has
accepted the new situation rather calmly since it feels a
U.S. -China rapprochement will not "immediately" open up di-
rect trade between Washington and Peking. Yet, sooner or
later, these leaders recognize that the U.S. would become
73Japan's biggest rival in China. Therefore, from the
trade angle, Japanese business circles are not encouraged
by the warming trend in Sino-American relations. By the
same token, they do not want to see any encouragement given
to American economic competition in the lucrative Taiwan
market
.
The business community prefers to stay out of the ide-
ological conflict between the U.S. and China, since it stands
by the separation of business and politics. As a trading na-
tion, Japan depends upon international economic cooperation
and cannot chose trading partners based upon type of govern-
ment. All things considered, the reduced tension created by
an ideological accommodation would seem to benefit Japanese
businessmen.
Economic leaders hold the same view of the strategic
balance as do the LDP and the bureaucracy. That is, they
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strongly prefer a continuation of the present power equation
in Asia. A movement of the U.S. away from Japan toward China
and/or Russia would provoke a security and eocnomic crisis
in Japan. As discussed earlier, the foreign policy options
then available to Japan would be far less desirable than the
present direction.
Similarly, Japan will support American efforts to limit
China's nuclear force development. It appears that China
will move toward arms limitation agreements only when she
feels she has parity with the two superpowers. Nonetheless,
Japanese business leaders, in concert with the government,
view China's warheads as a potential threat to Japan's secur-
ity and will bring what pressure they can to bear on China.
In short, a study of the Japanese economic community's
attitudes toward the U.S. and China reveals the close harmony
between the community's mainstream and government. The pre-
vailing opinion among these leaders is that, from virtually
all perspectives, a continuation of the warming trend in
Sino-American relations must be watched very carefully to
determine to what extent it might develop contrary to the
best interests of Japan.
E. PUBLIC OPINION
Contrary to common belief, the Nixon shock did not great-
ly effect, in an immediate sense, Japanese opinion regarding
the China issue. (Tables 9 and 10). The significant shift
in opinion occurred after Prime Minister Tanaka actually
visited Peking and established formal ties with China. In
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polls taken shortly thereafter, about one out of three adults
strongly approved his actions, another 50?, felt that "it was






Japanese Attitudes toward China
(by percentage of responses)
U.N. seat U.N. seat U.N. seats Don't
for Peking for Taipei for both know
January 1971 11 7 34 48
Late July 1971 13 6 31 49
Source: Nihon Risachi Senta, Jan. and July 1971, Yoron
chosa, Nov. 1971, p. 75; cited by Watanabe,
"Japanese Public Opinion," p. 129.
TABLE 10
Japanese Opinions on Establishing Formal Relations
with the People's Republic of China
(by percentage of responses)
Yes, Yes , as No need Not nec- Don't
Immedi- soon as to make essary know/




16 47 23 4 100
11 44 13 1 31 100
Nixon reveals his plan to visit China)
China is admitted to U.N.
)
14 44 13 1 28 100
Tanaka forms a new cabinet)
17 45 13 1 24 100
19 45 13 2 22 101










difficult to compare it directly with the others because
its questions were phrased rather differently.
Sources: Mar. 1970 results from Mainichi Shimbunsha; the
others from Jiji Tsushinsha, Yoron Chosa , June
1971, p. 67; Jan. 1972; Oct. 1972, p. 75; and
Nov. 1972, p. 74; cited by Watanabe, "Japanese
Public Opinion," p. 129.
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Japanese still suffered qualms of conscience in making
the embarrassing choice between Peking and Taipei. In Octo-
ber 1972, shortly after the government made the decision to
sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, only 6% of the Japa-
nese people approved of this action without reservation and
15% expressly disapproved. 51% answered that it was "the
only possible thing to do."
Turning to the present, there is very little Japanese
public opinion information available concerning the current
issues in Sino-American relations. It seems likely, however,
that the questions of normalization of relations and the
ideological conflict between the U.S. and China are of rela-
tively minor importance to the common man in Japan. (In
1965, while ^3% of the people were "very much interested"
in Vietnam, 62% attached the same priority to traffic prob-
76
lems (mulitple answers given) .) Similarly, few private
citizens can be expected to be as concerned over trade compe-
tition in China as the businessmen (unless it has an imme-
diate effect on their pocketbooks ) . In all probability,
what little active public interest exists concerning these
issues is insufficient to significantly effect government
attitudes
.
However, there is, quite naturally, considerable public
interest in the security of Japan. Tables 11 and 12 illus-
trate that, althoug the Japanese people may have desired
neutrality in 1969, most felt that Japan was incapable of
providing its own defense. This feeling could have future
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implications if Japan perceives that her security require-
ments are not being met by the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty
TABLE 11
"Do you think our country's defense should be conducted
by our own strength?" (Italics addedT
I think so
I do not think so
Other answers










, January 1, 1969; cited by White,
"Japan's China Policy," p. 262
TABLE 12
"Do you think Japan's peace and security can be safe-
guarded by Japan's own independent power?" (Italics
added)
Yes, it is possible to safe-
guard it 17.9%




Don't know and no answer
101.0%
Source: See Table 11.
Public concern over the issue of Asain strategic sta-
bility also exists. Back in 1963, when a newspaper asked
Tokyo citizens: "Recent press reports say that Communist
China may carry out a nuclear test shortly. If the test
takes place, do you think that it will greatly endanger
Japan's security or that it will have nothing to do with
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Japan's security?" 68% responded that it would endanger or
greatly endanger Japan's security. 77 A follow-up question
asked that 68%, "What do you think Japan should do?" 71%
replied that Japan should call upon Communist China to stop
nuclear testing and nuclear armament. 7£
Six years later in 1969, nearly 16% of the respondents
to an opinion poll felt that Communist China was still a
threat to the security of Japan (Table 13).
TABLE 13
"Do you think there are countries which will pose threats




North Korea 2. 3%
Other 2 . 4%
(There are such countries) (47.7%)
No country which will
become a threat 16.7%
Don't know; no answer 35-7%
100.1%
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun
, August 7, 1969; cited by White,
"Japan's China Policy," p. 251.
One Japanese intellectual has assessed the current public
mood in Japan as follows
:
Recent international developments , including the Sino-
American rapprochement , have reduced the need for Japan
to choose between the American alliance and Chinese
friendship, which in turn has helped to undermine the
opposition to the treaty. On the other hand, these de-
velopments have given rise to the argument that, in view
of the seemingly reduced international tension in Asia,
Japan need rely less than in the past on the United States.
Japan's response to the retrenchment of American military
presence abroad has also been ambinguous. Although their
fear of becoming unintentionally involved in international
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conflicts through the treaty commitment with the U.S. is
now greatly reduced, Japanese can no longer be sure about
the U.S. intention to remain in Asia. U.S. credibility




The reactions of the most important group studied in
this paper, the Liberal Democratic Party, to possible
U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments are not difficult to anti-
cipate. A cooling of relations between the two superpowers
would Increase tension in the region and, once again, put
the Japanese leadership in the unpopular position of having
to choose between the U.S. and China. The present condi-
tion of lukewarm Sino-American relations is almost ideal,
since Japan has political and economic ties with both
countries in a non-hostile environment. Normalization, by
itself, does not necessarily indicate warmer relations.
In the eyes of the LDP, a significantly closer association
between the U.S. and the P.R.C. which tended to isolate
Japan is the worst possible development. With such an
eventuality, the alliance upon which the LDP has based its
policy would be severly jeopardized, and Japan's role in
this new equilibrium would probably require a profoundly
different foreign policy direction. However, the LDP would
favor a better U.S.-P.R.C. relationship if it included
Japan.
The parties in opposition to the LDP government, led by
the Japan Socialist Party, which holds over twice as many
seats in the House of Representatives as the next largest
party, are not united in their policies toward the U.S.
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and China. However, they would all seem to favor cooler
Sino-American relations because, on the part of the left-
leaning JSP, American imperialism would again be the common
enemy of the JSP and the Chinese Communist Party, and, in
general, political mileage could be made against an LDP
government which presumably would align Japan alongside the
U.S. against the P.R.C. It follows that, since the current
situation is not optimum from the opposition party view-
point, this group does not prefer a continuation of present
U.S. -P.R.C. relations. The opposition also opposes a clos-
er Sino-American association since it might exclude Japan,
and thus threaten the stated goals of neutrality and inde-
pendence (and, except for the Democratic Socialist Party,
disarmament). Unless these minority parties can unify their
opposition to the LDP, which appears unlikely over the next
few years, their impact on governmental policy will not be
significant
.
Table lh indicates that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry can be
expected to concur with each other, and with the LDP and
business, in reacting to possible U.S. -P.R.C. policy
developments. MITI opposes a deterioration of relations
between the two countries because it would probably hurt
Japan's economic intercourse with China, while the prevail-
ing view in the Foreign Office agrees with the LDP that
such an evolution might put Japan squarely between the
Americans and the Chinese. Again, a continuation of the
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present lukewarm state of Sino-American relations is seen
by the bureaucracy to be in Japan's best interests. Trade-
conscious MITI would not favor a warmer U.S.-P.R.C. associ-
ation since it would likely entail an end to lucrative
Japan-Taiwan trade and probably would produce more lively
Japanese-American competition for the China market. The
internationally-minded MFA would oppose a warmer Sino-Ameri-
can relationship if it tended to isolate Japan and thus
present a threat to the U.S. -Japan alliance and Japan's
national security interests.
It may be assumed that the economic community holds the
same views toward future U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments as
do its partners in the Japanese conservative leadership,
the LDP and the bureaucracy. Cooler relations between those
two countries would almost certainly hurt Japanese trade
with China, and^ more importantly, the increased tension
would likely inhibit regional economic development. In
the favored, current situation, Japanese businessmen enjoy
economic ties with the U.S., the P.R.C. and Taiwan. From
the viewpoint of this group, a closer Sino-American rela-
tionship might yield undesirable effects: curtailment of
Taiwan trade, competition between U.S. and Japanese compa-
nies in China and in the long run, a possible national
security threat which could lead to a major diversion of
funds from the economy into defense needs.
In the Japanese public's eyes, Sino-American relations




ANTICIPATED REACTIONS OF JAPANESE INTEREST GROUPS





























5 . . . Oppose
6 . . . Unclear
difficult to pinpoint the attitudes of the citizenry toward
possible U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments and their implica-
tions for Japan. Historically, the LDP has not been partic-
ularly responsive to public opinion. But if the Sino-
American relationship undergoes a significant change, the
impact upon all Japanese will be deeply felt, and at that
point the popular voice may well become an important foreign
policy ingredient.
The right column of Table 14 reveals a remarkable con-
sensus in Japan regarding U.S.-P.R.C. relations. The mes-
sage seems clear. Under present conditions, a move on the
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part of the U.S. to solve such specific issues as conditions
of trade or even the normalization of relations (without
abandoning Taiwan) can be viewed by Japan only as contribut-
ing to the stability and peace of Asia. But any substantial
development in relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C.
which might lead to such warming of relations as the trans-
fer of sophisticated technology or weapons systems or any
other act which might tend to upset the strategic balance
in Asia would be considered by Japan as running counter to
the interests of Japanese of all persuasions and might
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